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Abstract
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to eﬃciently resolve ﬁnancial distress by contract
as opposed to exclusively rely on state intervention. We characterize which ﬁnancial contracts are opti-
mal depending on investor protection against fraud, and how eﬃcient is the resulting resolution of ﬁnancial
distress. We ﬁnd that when investor protection is strong, issuing a convertible debt security to a large,
secured creditor who has the exclusive right to reorganize or liquidate the ﬁrm yields the ﬁrst best. Con-
version of debt into equity upon default allows contracts to collateralize the whole ﬁrm to that creditor,
not just certain physical assets, thereby inducing him to internalize the upside from eﬃcient reorganization.
Concentration of liquidation rights on such creditor avoids costly inter-creditor conﬂicts. When instead in-
vestor protection is weak, the only feasible debt structure has standard foreclosure rights, even if it induces
over-liquidation. The normative implications are that lifting legal restrictions on ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing,
convertibles and concentration of liquidation rights, and increasing investor protection against fraud should
improve the eﬃciency of resolutions of ﬁnancial distress.
JEL classiﬁcation: G33, K22.
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The eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial distress calls for liquidating unproﬁtable ﬁrms and reorganizing
those ﬁrms that are only temporarily insolvent, while a tt h es a m et i m ee n s u r i n gt h a tc r e d i t o r sa r e
repaid. In the real world ﬁnancial distress is often resolved under state-mandated procedures and
court supervision. Yet both practitioners and academics are dissatisﬁed with existing procedures,
which are regarded as favoring the piecemeal liquidation of healthy ﬁrms, the lengthy reorganization
of unproﬁtable ones, and the reduction of contractual repayment to creditors (e.g. Hart 1995,
Franks, Nyborg and Torous 1996). Accordingly, academics have advanced several proposals to
reform existing state-mandated bankruptcy procedures.1
Of course, it is not immediately obvious why an eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial distress should
rely on state-mandated procedures to begin with, instead of just leaving everything to contracts.
Indeed, some law and economics scholars have argued in favor of a contractual resolution of ﬁnan-
cial distress (e.g. Schwartz 1997, Rasmussen 1992). According to this view, optimal debt contracts
would include provisions for resolving ﬁnancial distress eﬃciently, allowing the parties to do away
with state intervention. The typical counter-argument is that such optimal contracts are too com-
plex or costly for the parties to devise, especially when ex post conﬂicts among multiple creditors
need to be taken care of (Hart 1995, 2000).
In practice, the full extent of the parties’ inability to write contracts about ﬁnancial distress is
hard to gauge. The reason is that in the real world such contracts are often just legally forbidden or
overruled by bankruptcy courts. Thus, the parties’ reluctance to contract about ﬁnancial distress
may just reﬂect such legal restrictions to private contracting rather than the parties’ inability to
contract in the ﬁrst place. What would happen if those legal restrictions were lifted?
This paper presents a model where the parties are both able and legally free to contract about
ﬁnancial distress. This theoretical experiment allows us to ask, which contracts help to eﬃciently
resolve ﬁnancial distress? Under which conditions are these contracts more eﬃcient? Answering
these questions can shed light on exactly which contractual provisions the parties need to be able to
write, providing a testing ground for the possibility of a contractual resolution of ﬁnancial distress.
Our idea is that relatively simple debt contracts may allow the parties to eﬃciently resolve
ﬁnancial distress. In particular, contracts should collateralize the ﬁrm’s reorganization value to the
1See for example Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992), Berglöf, Roland and von Thadden (2003), Cornelli and Felli
(1997), Povel (1999), Berkovitch and Israel (1999), Bernhardt and Nosal (2004), Giammarino and Nosal (1994), Chen
and Sundaresan (2003), Ayotte and Yun (2006), and most recently Eraslan and Yilmaz (2007).
1creditors, not just certain physical assets. This way, contracts can allow creditors to fully internalize
the upside from eﬃcient reorganization, while at the same time maximizing contractual repayment.
In practice, we argue that even in the absence of legal restrictions the ability of contracts to
collateralize the ﬁrm’s reorganization value depends on the extent of managerial tunneling (Shleifer
and Vishny 1997). When those who control a corporation can divert its proﬁts to themselves, very
few of the reorganization proceeds can be collateralized to the creditors.
Section 2 presents a simple model of credit where one creditor and one entrepreneur try to
resolve ﬁnancial distress by way of an ex ante contract but face the risk of insiders’ tunneling.
We parameterize legal protection against tunneling by the share of the ﬁrm’s reorganization value
that contracts can pledge to creditors. We ﬁnd that under strong protection against tunneling the
ﬁrm’s reorganization value can be collateralized by using a “convertible debt” contract. Under
such contract the creditor is pledged both physical collateral and an equity stake in the reorganized
ﬁrm. The creditor has also the exclusive right to decide whether to liquidate or reorganize the ﬁrm
upon default. The equity stake in the reorganized ﬁrm makes the creditor residual claimant to the
ﬁrm’s reorganization value; physical collateral makes him claimant to the ﬁrm’s liquidation value.
As a result, when investor protection against tunneling is strong, our "convertible debt" contract
allows the investor to internalize both the social beneﬁts and costs of reorganization, allowing the
parties to attain a ﬁr s tb e s te ﬃcient resolution of distress.2
If legal protection against tunneling is low, then the creditor is better oﬀ by ousting the manage-
ment and triggering a quick piecemeal liquidation than by going through a lengthy reorganization
that only increases the risk of tunneling. In this case ﬁnancing ex ante requires committing to
liquidation ex post, for example via a “straight debt” contract giving only standard foreclosure
rights to the creditor. The piecemeal liquidation of healthy ﬁr m si st h u st h ep r i c et op a yt oe n s u r e
ﬁnancing when legal protection against tunneling is low.3
These results already show that — provided legal protection against tunneling is strong enough
2This mechanism may remind the reader of bankruptcy reform proposals (e.g. Aghion, Hart and Moore 1992)
relying on conversion of debt into equity upon default. However, our "convertible debt" diﬀers from the Aghion,
Hart and Moore (1992) proposal in one vital respect. In our optimal contract, debt is converted into equity only
after (not before) the investor has decided to reorganize the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm is liquidated, the investor obtains the
value of his physical collateral. As we shall see, giving the investor an equity stake in addition to physical collateral
crucially fosters the ability of contracts to give the investor the incentive to eﬃciently resolve ﬁnancial distress. It is
also important to stress that Aghion, Hart and Moore only focus on ex post eﬃc i e n c y :t h e yd on o ts t u d ye xa n t e
issues and do not study what mechanisms are optimal at low levels of investor protection. Section 5.3 compares our
results with the Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) proposal in greater detail.
3Our model also rationalizes the need for debt contracts to rely on courts’ expertise when legal protection against
tunneling is intermediate. In addition, Section 3 shows that a similar convertible security to the one just described
also ensures the ﬁrst best when only the debtor knows the ﬁrm’s reorganization value.
2— a simple convertible security has the potential for resolving ﬁnancial distress eﬃciently. To fully
test such potential we need to study the case with multiple creditors, as a major argument for state
intervention in bankruptcy is the concern that under contractual freedom conﬂicts among creditors
would lead to the liquidation of viable ﬁrms (e.g. Jackson 1986).
Section 4 studies the case of multiple creditors. We consider the three leading inter-creditor
conﬂicts stressed by bankruptcy scholars: the conﬂict among secured creditors leading to ineﬃcient
runs on the ﬁrm’s assets and thus to over-liquidation (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996), the conﬂict
between secured and unsecured creditors also leading to over-liquidation (Hart 1995), and the
conﬂict between existing and new creditors, leading to under- and over-investment in ﬁnancial
distress (Myers 1977, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Gertner and Scharfstein 1991).
We ﬁnd that the optimal debt structure has two main ingredients. First, liquidation rights
should be concentrated on a single large lender. Even if many creditors can have the right to cash
some liquidation proceeds, only the large lender can command that the ﬁrms’ assets be partially or
totally liquidated, regardless of the other creditors’ ex post preferences. Second, an equity stake in
the reorganized ﬁrm should be pledged under a convertible debt contract to such large lender (whose
debt claim should in turn be under-secured), so as to induce him to internalize the upside from
eﬃcient reorganization. The rest of the lending should then be dispersed among many creditors.
Intuitively, concentration of liquidation rights on the large lender avoids ineﬃcient runs on the
ﬁrm’s assets. Thus, inter-creditor conﬂicts do not necessarily follow from freedom of contracting,
despite common intuition to the contrary (e.g. Jackson 1986). At the same time, convertible
debt gives such lender the incentive to implement the eﬃcient reorganization policy upon default.
Importantly, these incentives also prevent him from abusing his power by threatening other parties
that he will ineﬃciently reorganize or liquidate the ﬁrm to force an opportunistic restructuring.
Finally, dispersion of the rest of the lending prevents the formation of coalitions of creditors that
might sometimes bribe the holder of liquidation rights into ineﬃcient liquidation.
Little changes if new creditors need to join the ﬁrm’s debt structure in ﬁnancial distress, for
example to ﬁnance a new investment opportunity. In this case, the large creditor is given the
additional, exclusive right to decide whether to allow any supra-priority ﬁnancing. However, the
reorganization proceeds accruing to such large creditor should be reduced by a ﬁxed proportion of
any new, supra-priority ﬁnancing. This way, not only does conversion of debt into equity allow
the creditor to internalize the upside of re-ﬁnancing, but also its downside, thereby triggering re-
ﬁnancing if and only if the investment opportunity has a positive NPV. As a result, we show that
3the problems usually associated with the multiplicity of creditors in ﬁnancial distress are more
likely the result of sub-optimal debt structures rather than intrinsic problems of ﬁnancial distress.
Much in the spirit of the single creditor case, we ﬁnd that the optimal debt structure just
discussed is feasible only when legal protection against tunneling is strong. When legal protection
against tunneling is weak the only feasible debt structures give standard foreclosure rights to the
creditors, thereby triggering ex post ineﬃcient liquidations and under-investment.
These results rationalize the evidence that more developed countries have a comparative advan-
tage at using more ﬂexible ﬁnancial contracts (Lerner and Schoar 2005, Qian and Strahan 2006)
and more ﬂexible resolutions of ﬁnancial distress (Djankov et al. 2006).
Remarkably, our results indicate that a quite simple debt structure can attain an eﬃcient
resolution of ﬁnancial distress. Interestingly, many of the features of our optimal debt structure
are indeed observed in some common law countries such as the U.K., where the parties are allowed
to ﬁnance under a ﬂoating charge. Much in the spirit of our convertible contract, upon default the
ﬂoating charge holder becomes the residual claimant to the whole ﬁrm (not just to the value of its
physical assets). Consistent with our model the ﬂoating charge holder has the exclusive contractual
right to liquidate the ﬁrm and the rest of the lending is dispersed (Franks and Sussman 2005).
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to rationalize ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing in an
optimal contracting setup.
These considerations lead to the normative implications of our analysis, discussed in Section 5.
First, our analysis suggests that there might be signiﬁcant beneﬁts in increasing contractual freedom
as opposed to exclusively rely on state intervention to resolve ﬁnancial distress. Concretely, legal
reform should focus on allowing ﬂoating charge, convertibles and concentration of liquidation rights.
These recommendations stand in sharp contrast with current practice in many countries where
bankruptcy codes impose ex post unanimity or supra-majority voting rules, overrule convertibles
(Smith and Strömberg 2003) and, most important, forbid the ﬂoating charge (e.g. Djankov et al.
2006) despite evidence that when it is used it works pretty well (Djankov et al. 2006, Franks and
Sussman 2005)4.
Second, to maximize the gains from private contracting, reforms enhancing freedom of con-
tract should be combined with reforms enhancing investor protection against fraud in general anti
4There is a concern that the U.K. system may favor ineﬃcient liquidations. In light of our model, this is consistent
with the fact that U.K. courts sometimes allow several creditors to unilaterally repossess collateral upon default (e.g.
Franks and Nyborg 1996), thereby countering the concentration of liquidation rights in the hands of the ﬂoating
charge holder.
4self-dealing provisions in company law (Djankov et al. 2005) and more speciﬁcally in fraudulent
conveyance law in bankruptcy codes (e.g. Baird 2006). Section 5 stresses the advantages of our
proposals with respect to leading academic proposals for bankruptcy reform (Aghion, Hart and
Moore 1992, Bolton and Rosenthal 2002, Jensen 1989).
2 The Model
We describe the basic setup in Section 2.1 and the contracting frictions in Section 2.2.
2.1 The Basic Setup
We study a model of credit in the spirit of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore (1998).
At w o - p e r i o dﬁrm requires an initial outlay of K>0 for the purchase of a physical asset. The
ﬁrm is run by a penniless entrepreneur whose human capital is indispensable. In period 1,w i t h
probability π the ﬁrm is liquid and produces a cash ﬂow y1 > 0; with probability 1 − π the ﬁrm is
in ﬁnancial distress and its cash ﬂow is 0.I f t h e ﬁr mw a sl i q u i di np e r i o d1,i t sp e r i o d2 cash ﬂow
is y2; if instead the ﬁrm was in ﬁnancial distress, with probability μ the ﬁrm is viable as a going
concern and its period 2 cash ﬂow is y2, while with probability 1 − μ the ﬁrm is also in economic
distress and its period 2 cash ﬂow is y2. To simplify the algebra, we set μ =1 /2.
Figure 1. States of Nature
ω Pr(ω) y1 (ω) y2 (ω)
Gπ y 1 y2
U (1 − π)/20 y2
B (1 − π)/20 y2
Thus, the ﬁrm can be in one of three states of nature, G (”good”), U (”unlucky”) and B (”bad”),
(Figure 1). At the end of period 1 and before period 2, the physical asset can be liquidated, yielding
L. One can think of L as representing the value of the ﬁrm’s physical asset in a piecemeal liquidation,
as opposed to the value y2 (ω) generated by a reorganization. In state U, the reorganization value
of the ﬁrm y2 (U)=y2 can be interpreted both as the value under E, and as the value under
an alternative management team generating yALT = y2.5 Both investment and liquidation are
5This setup helps us to illustrate our ﬁndings in the most intuitive manner, but Appendix A2.1 shows that our
5zero-one decisions (Section 4 allows for partial liquidation). We assume:
A.1: y1 > y2 >L>y 2 > 0.
Besides imposing y1 > y2 (which only simpliﬁes the exposition and does not entail a loss
in generality), A.1 implies that in the ﬁrst best the project should be liquidated if and only if
reorganization proﬁts are low; in G the project is both liquid and proﬁtable, in U the project is
illiquid but eventually proﬁtable. Only in B is the project both illiquid and unproﬁtable so that
it should be liquidated. We also assume:
A.2: π(y1 + y2)+( 1− π)L>K .
A.2 implies that the net present value of the ﬁrm is positive even if its assets are liquidated in
U, when continuation is eﬃcient. This assumption only simpliﬁes the exposition of our ﬁndings on
contract choice; its implications will become clear after Proposition 1. To ﬁnance the ﬁrm, E tries
to borrow from a wealthy investor I under a contract ensuring that I breaks even. To describe
the set of feasible contracts, we must specify the contracting frictions in our model.
2.2 Contracting Frictions
We stress two contracting frictions. The ﬁrst captures the extent of legal protection of investors
against managerial tunneling and is measured by the share α ∈ [0,1] of the ﬁrm’s (ﬁrst and second
period) cash ﬂows that can be pledged to I. The remaining share (1 − α) goes to E. Legal
protection against tunneling increases in α. Our model nests the Hart and Moore (1998) case of
unveriﬁable cash ﬂows as a special case when α =0 . We thus allow for non-dissipative private
beneﬁts (Aghion and Bolton 1992), but the size of such private beneﬁts depends on the extent
of investor protection α, using a formulation introduced in a diﬀerent context by Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002) and Johnson et al. (2000). This formulation allows us to ask one key question of
our paper, namely how do contractual resolutions of ﬁnancial distress vary with investor protection.
Such contracting friction introduces two diﬀerences with respect to Hart and Moore (1998).
First, in our model the ﬁrst period liquidation proceeds pledgeable to I are not just equal to L but
to L + αy1(ω), that is equal to the value of the ﬁrm’s physical assets L plus the amount αy1(ω)
of ﬁrst period cash ﬂows that E was unable to divert. Second, and more important, there is a
potential incentive for I to reorganize: by doing so, I obtains αy2 (ω) in period 2,a so p p o s e dt o
zero in the Hart and Moore (1998) model. Notice that E can fully pledge physical collateral L as
basic results generalize to a setting where ﬁrst and second period proﬁts as well as liquidation values are stochastic
and take on a continuum of values.
6in Hart and Moore (1998) but can only pledge other less tangible property up to the extent of
investor protection α. We could allow investor protection to increase the pledgeability of physical
collateral, too. All of our results still go through as long as investor protection makes it relatively
easier to pledge cash ﬂows than physical assets.
The second contracting friction we consider is the courts’ precision in estimating the ﬁrm’s
reorganization value. We assume that courts correctly estimate the continuation value with prob-
ability 1 − θ. As a result, in state B (U) the court mistakenly believes that the entrepreneur
is unlucky (bad) and that the ﬁrm should be reorganized (liquidated) with probability θ ≤ 1/2.
Hence, θ captures the (lack of) judicial expertise in estimating the ﬁrm’s reorganization value.6 As
in Aghion and Bolton (1992) one can view θ as an index of contractual incompleteness, which arises
from the parties’ impossibility to fully specify ex ante under what circumstances the ﬁrm should be
liquidated or reorganized, that is whether the state is B or U. We thus allow the parties to con-
tract also on the realization of courts’ estimates of the reorganization value. Indeed, if courts can
perfectly estimate the ﬁrm’s reorganization value, then ﬁnancial distress can be eﬃciently resolved
simply by letting courts decide whether to liquidate or reorganize an insolvent ﬁrm.
What about the parties’ information structure? We assume that E and I are perfectly informed
about the ﬁrm’s reorganization value, but — as we will discuss — our main results also extend to the
case where only E is informed. Figure 2 shows the timing of the model.
Figure 2. Timeline
 
Cash flows y1 realized
 
Decision whether to liquidate 
and realize L 
Cash flows y2 realized 
(if not liquidated) 




We consider contracts where I lends D ≥ K to E in exchange for a repayment schedule. First
period repayments can be contingent on the state of nature. We then allow contracts to allocate to
6We mainly interpret θ as reﬂecting courts’ inability to directly verify the ﬁrm’s reorganization value, but one
might also interpret it as stemming from the parties’ choice to contract on a fully veriﬁable signal with imprecision θ.
7E, I or the court the decision of whether to liquidate or reorganize the ﬁrm after ﬁrst period proﬁts
and repayment. Thus, we further depart from the Hart and Moore (1998) model by allowing parties
to write contracts contingent on the state of ﬁnancial distress. In the spirit of Aghion and Bolton
(1992), we allow for contracts specifying I or E control. However, we further depart from Aghion
and Bolton (1992) by allowing repayments to depend on whether the party in control reorganized
or liquidated the ﬁrm in ﬁnancial distress. This assumption allows contracts to provide the party in
control with incentives to take an eﬃcient decision. As we will see, the parties’ ability to provide
such incentives (and the resulting eﬃciency of contracts) will depend on α ,t h a ti so nE’s ability
to pledge to I the ﬁrm’s reorganization value.7
3 Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress
We now study the extent to which the parties can resolve ﬁnancial distress by appropriately designed
debt contracts in the case with one creditor. We ﬁrst study the case without ex post renegotiation,
and summarize the results in Proposition 1. We then turn to the case of renegotiation and
summarize the results in Proposition 2. We highlight the key results of our analysis by focusing
only on the states U and B where the project is in ﬁnancial distress. The Appendix studies the
optimal contract by taking also state G into account.8
3.1 Optimal Contract Terms
In states U and B ﬁrst period repayment is zero, the ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress, and the key decision
to be made is whether the ﬁrm should be liquidated, which is eﬃcient in B, or reorganized, which
is eﬃcient in U. As stressed by Jensen (1991) the decision is complicated by the fact that on the
one hand bankruptcy courts often lack the ability to independently assess the ﬁrm’s reorganization
value (i.e. whether the state is U or B), on the other hand the parties lack the incentive to report
unbiased estimates of such value.
7Aghion and Bolton (1992) also consider the case where actions are veriﬁable and note that in this case the
allocation of cash ﬂows can serve incentive purposes. However, rather than explicitly solving for optimal contracts,
they establish that even in this case similar agency problems to the case of unveriﬁable actions arise.
8Disregarding state G is not important, because contract terms for G are set in isolation. The independence of
G from U and B arises because in our model courts perfectly determine if the state is G or not (i.e. if the ﬁrst
period cash ﬂow is 0 or y1). As a result, G only aﬀects the optimal resolution of ﬁnancial distress in states U and
B by aﬀecting the ex ante break even constraint. The alternative assumption that courts cannot perfectly tell apart
strategic and liquidity defaults would only complicate the analysis without changing our main results. Note that,
as in Hart and Moore (1998), although strategic default in state G is a theoretical possibility, it will never arise in
equilibrium under optimal contract terms.
8It turns out that such conﬂict can be solved by the parties with an ex ante debt contract,
provided that they can eﬀectively write claims on the ﬁrm’s reorganization value. Suppose that we
are in a contractual freedom regime, that is there are no legal restrictions in doing so. Then, the
parties can implement an ex post optimal reorganization decision by collateralizing to I the whole
reorganization proceeds αy2 and not just certain physical assets.
Consider for example the case where, in addition to a claim on the ﬁrm’s reorganization proceeds,
I is also given control over the decision of whether to liquidate or reorganize. If αy2 ≥ L,e v e n
if I has foreclosure rights on all of the ﬁrm’s physical assets, he still ﬁnds it optimal to liquidate
i fa n do n l yi ft h es t a t ei sB, consistent with ex post optimality. If instead αy2 <L , then under
the previous contract I has a bias for liquidation and thus liquidates also in state U.A n e x a n t e
contract can remove such bias by lowering I’s proceeds from liquidation, for example through a
debt write-down for an amount S such that:
αy2 ≥ L − S. (1)
Hence, as long as the parties can contract ex ante on the ﬁrm’s reorganization value, contracts
can allow the investor to internalize the social costs and beneﬁts of the decision to liquidate or
reorganize, thereby triggering an ex post eﬃcient outcome. In practice, one simple way to give I
such incentives is to use ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing, as in many common law countries (Djankov, et al.,
2006). Unlike the ﬁxed charge, which corresponds to collateral over certain speciﬁc physical assets,
the ﬂoating charge is a security that can be extended to cover the whole pool of the company’s
assets, including intangibles and working capital (i.e. cash, receivables and future cash ﬂows). In
the context of our model, a ﬂoating charge corresponds to pledging to I the reorganization proceeds
αy2. One way to implement our optimal contract in practice is to give I:1 )aﬂoating charge, 2)
a ﬁx e dc h a r g eo ns o m eo ft h eﬁrm’s physical assets (i.e. on L−S), and 3) the contractual right to
decide whether to seize the company’s assets and liquidate them.9
The full potential of ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing will be seen in Section 4, where E borrows from
multiple creditors. However, the one-creditor case already shows a key property of the ﬂoating
9Expression (1) already shows one key diﬀerence between our optimal contract and the Aghion, Hart and Moore
(1992) proposal to convert debt into equity upon default. Under the latter, a debtholder given a fraction x of shares
votes for reorganization if and only if xαy2 ≥ xL.I f α<1,s o m es o c i a l l yp r o ﬁtable reorganizations are passed.
By contrast, allowing the ﬂoating charge holder to choose between his physical collateral L − S a n de q u i t yi nt h e
reorganized ﬁrm allows parties to give him the incentive to eﬃciently reorganize even at relatively low α.
9charge: it allows contracts to pledge the ﬁrm’s reorganization value to I, who in turn internalizes
the upside from eﬃcient reorganization. As a result, with respect to physical collateral, the ﬂoating
charge induces I to take an eﬃcient reorganization decision and at the same time maximizes
contractual repayment. For example, if αy2 >Lthe ﬂoating charge induces eﬃcient reorganization
in U and allows I to receive a repayment of αy2. Under physical collateral alone instead, not only
is the creditor biased towards liquidation but, even if renegotiation takes place, in U the investor
obtains strictly less than αy2 as long as he does not have all the bargaining power.
Another contract that closely resembles the ﬂoating charge is convertible debt. Under convert-
ible debt, the debt contract gives I a large equity stake upon default and reorganization. This
way, the contract collateralizes to I the whole reorganized ﬁrm as opposed to just certain physical
assets.10 Unlike many standard convertibility clauses, however, our conversion mechanism does not
rely on ﬁnancial markets providing the market value of shares (which is at best noisy in ﬁnancial
distress), but on the parties’ reorganization decision. Notwithstanding this key diﬀerence, for ease
of exposition we call convertible debt the above contractual typology.11
The contract just considered relies on I being perfectly informed about the ﬁrm’s reorganization
value. Of course, it may sometimes be the case that only E i sp e r f e c t l yi n f o r m e da b o u tt h eﬁrm’s
reorganization value. In such case, an ex post eﬃcient outcome is attained under a convertible debt
contract where E controls the decision whether to liquidate or reorganize a ﬁnancially distressed
ﬁrm. In case of reorganization, the contract commits E to give I an equity stake in the ﬁrm. Yet,
this is not enough, as E would then always reorganize to get (at least) (1 − α)y2 > 0.T o r e m o v e
E’s pro-reorganization bias, some liquidation proceeds must be given to E,f o re x a m p l ev i aad e b t
write-down S such that:
(1 − α)y2 ≥ S ≥ (1 − α)y2. (2)
Once more, the conﬂict between the parties is solved by giving E the incentive to implement the ex
post eﬃcient policy. In Section 5, we will show that this contract eﬀectively amounts to allowing
E to make a non-cash bid for the ﬁrm and thus rationalizes some aspects of the Aghion, Hart
10While ﬂoating charge and convertible debt are formally diﬀerent (i.e. the ﬂoating charge holder does not literally
receive equity upon default), they share the same property of making I residual claimant of the ﬁrm upon default.
In Section 5 we argue that a key diﬀerence between these two contracts concerns the extent to which their relative
performance depends on creditor vs. shareholder protection against fraud.
11Our convertible debt contract has a key diﬀerence with the convertible debt contract studied by Aghion and
Bolton (1992). Aghion and Bolton (1992) interpret conversion of debt into equity as triggering a shift in control
rights from E to I. By contrast, in our optimal contract conversion of debt into equity occurs after I has decided
to reorganize. Thus, in our model conversion provides I w i t hi n c e n t i v e st ot a k ea ne ﬃcient reorganization decision.
10and Moore (1992) proposal for bankruptcy reform and dominates proposals for resolving ﬁnancial
distress by using cash auctions (Jensen 1989).
Although the above convertible securities resolve ﬁn a n c i a ld i s t r e s si na ne xp o s te ﬃcient manner,
their ex ante optimality hinges on strong legal protection against tunneling. Indeed, the expected
repayment I obtains in ﬁnancial distress under convertible debt is:
(1/2)[αy2 +( L − S)]. (3)
Poor protection against tunneling can undermine break-even via two channels: ﬁrst, very little of
the reorganized ﬁrm can be pledged to I (αy2 is low); second, when α is low, only a high S induces
I to reorganize in U and E to liquidate in B.T h i s s e c o n d e ﬀect indicates that achieving ex post
optimality with convertible debt is costly if investor protection is low also because providing the
parties with appropriate incentives may undermine ex ante break even.
If α is so low that convertible debt is infeasible, ex ante ﬁnancing requires E and I to sacriﬁce
ex post eﬃciency. A simple way to go is thus to write a debt contract whereby I commits to
terminating the project in ﬁnancial distress. This contract is akin to the Hart and Moore (1998)
debt contract, whereby foreclosure automatically follows non-repayment. We call this arrangement
straight debt to stress its similarities with the standard notion of debt. Because in ﬁnancial distress
straight debt yields L to I, it facilitates break even relative to convertible debt whenever αy2 <L .
Unfortunately, this ex ante beneﬁt comes at the cost (y2 − L)/2 of over liquidating the ﬁrm in U.
As a result, even if convertible debt is infeasible, can the parties improve ex post eﬃciency with
respect to straight debt by using courts’ expertise?
Of course, the answer is yes if courts can perfectly estimate the ﬁrm’s reorganization value
(θ =0 ). In this case courts become mechanistic executors and the parties trivially dispose of the
ﬁrm by writing a “complete contract” mandating liquidation only in state B. If instead courts are
imperfectly informed, then using their expertise may result in over and under-liquidation. Still,
we ﬁnd that the parties are willing to use judicial expertise in their contract. In particular,
it is optimal for E to issue a convertible debt contract with a state-contingent debt write-down
S(ω), such that S(B)=0 ,a n dS(U)=L − αy2. While this contract still gives I control upon
default and equity upon reorganization, it speciﬁes a positive debt write-down only when necessary
(i.e. in state U,w h e r eI should reorganize). To underscore the importance of its state-contingent
11convertibility clause, we call such contract contingent debt.12 Under contingent debt,t h eﬁrm is
eﬃciently liquidated in B and over-liquidated with probability θ<1 in state U.T h u s , contingent
debt outperforms straight debt ex post. In addition, irrespective of θ,i nﬁnancial distress I obtains:
(1/2)[αy2 + L]. (4)
By comparing (3) and (4), it is easy to see that if αy2 <L , then contingent debt outperforms
convertible debt ex ante. Indeed, the use of judicial expertise reduces, for any level of investor
protection α, the share of liquidation proceeds that must accrue to E so as to provide the parties
with appropriate incentives to reveal their information about the ﬁrm’s reorganization value.13
To summarize, the above contractual resolutions of ﬁnancial distress diﬀer as to how they trade
oﬀ investor break even (ex ante eﬃciency) with eﬃcient reorganization (ex post eﬃciency). Straight
debt maximizes the former at the expense of the latter; convertible debt maximizes the latter at
the expense of the former; contingent debt is between them. Hence, whenever feasible convertible
debt yields the ﬁrst best, contingent debt the second best and straight debt the third best. Are
there other contracts that resolve ﬁnancial distress more eﬃciently? More importantly, how does
investor protection α aﬀect contracting and welfare? We ﬁnd14:
Proposition 1 Under contractual freedom, there exist αCO ≥ αC ≥ αS such that I breaks even if
and only if α ≥ αS.F o r α ≥ αCO, the parties attain the ﬁr s tb e s tb yr e s o l v i n gﬁnancial distress
with convertible debt. For α ∈ [αC,α CO), the parties attain the second best by resolving ﬁnancial
distress with contingent debt. In this range, social welfare decreases in θ.F o r α ∈ [αS,α C), the
parties attain the third best by resolving ﬁnancial distress with straight debt.
Straight debt, convertible debt and contingent debt are the most eﬃcient contracts for the par-
ties to resolve ﬁnancial distress.15 Crucially, legal protection against tunnelling α shapes their
12In fact, unlike in Aghion and Bolton (1992) where contingent control can be optimal, in our model contingent
c o n t r o li sa l w a y sd o m i n a t e db ycontingent debt, both ex post and ex ante. See the Appendix for details.
13If only E knows the ﬁrm’s reorganization value, then the only possible use of judicial expertise is to let the court
directly decide what to do with the ﬁrm. In this case, the court’s errors induce both over and under-liquidation and
also reduce I’s repayment which is equal to L + αy2 − θ(y2 − y
2).
14To preserve our focus on contracts, Proposition 1 (as well as Proposition 2) only reports which of the above
deﬁned contractual typologies is used as a function of α. Detailed Proofs, including the expression for total debt
capacity at diﬀerent levels of α,c a nb ef o u n di nA p p e n d i x1 .
15In principle, in the symmetric information interpretation of our model, the parties might avoid using court’s
expertise by including in their contract a revelation game (Maskin 1999) of the following sort. The parties separately
report the state of nature. The contract speciﬁes that if both reports are U the ﬁrm is reorganized, if both reports
are B the ﬁrm is liquidated. If reports disagree the ﬁrm is liquidated and the proceeds are paid to charity. This
12optimality by shaping the trade oﬀ between ex ante and ex post eﬃciency. If α is low, tunneling of
the ﬁrm by the controlling shareholders presents a major problem for creditors, creating pressure
for a quick piecemeal sale. To attain break even, the parties must commit to always liquidate ex
post by using straight debt.16 As a result, in our model the use of automatic foreclosure on the
debtor’s physical assets endogenously depends on low protection against tunneling α.
As α becomes higher, creditors see the upside of reorganizing a proﬁtable ﬁrm. In this case,
if they are allowed to write claims on the ﬁrm’s reorganization value, debt contracts can improve
ex post eﬃciency relative to straight debt. If α is high (α ≥ αCO), investor break even is easy
to attain and the parties reach the ﬁr s tb e s tb yu s i n gconvertible debt. The debtor now pledges
the whole reorganized ﬁrm as collateral, not only speciﬁc physical assets, thus providing I with
incentives for eﬃcient reorganization. Alternatively, E may be allowed to reorganize by pledging
to I an equity stake in the reorganized ﬁrm, which would also induce an ex post eﬃcient outcome.
If α is intermediate (αC ≤ α<α CO), the cost of endogenous information revelation is so large
that convertible debt is infeasible and the parties attain the second best under contingent debt.T h i s
contract still exploits the parties’ information, because — for any enforced debt write-down — I must
ultimately decide whether to liquidate or reorganize. However, the use of judicial expertise allows
I’s share of liquidation proceeds to be increased precisely when liquidation is eﬃcient, thereby
reducing the ex ante cost of incentives.
An objection to our result is that, even if the parties are allowed to contract about ﬁnancial
distress, they may also be allowed to renegotiate a new contract ex post. What happens to
Proposition 1 when the possibility of ex post renegotiation is explicitly considered? We establish:
Proposition 2 If I has all the bargaining power, then for αC ≤ α<α CO there is a function θR (α)
increasing in α such that, for θ ≤ θR (α), I lends K + θ(L − αy2) and parties attain the ﬁrst best
by resolving ﬁnancial distress under contingent debt. For every (α,θ) outside this region, contract
contract induces a truth telling Nash equilibrium implementing the ﬁrst best with the appropriate assignment of
payouts. Unfortunately, however, the players may also coordinate on two other Nash equilibria (always say B or
always say U, where the latter equilibrium could be eliminated by ﬁning the investor ex post for having told a lie). As
a result, whenever feasible, convertible debt dominates this revelation game because it implements the ﬁrst best as a
unique equilibrium. In addition, if there is uncertainty over which equilibrium the parties will coordinate on, the use
of judicial expertise would improve over this contract as long as court’s imprecision θ is not too high. Finally, there
are reasons to believe that the parties will readily renegotiate away the outcome of giving all liquidation proceeds to
charity. In this case, it would be highly unlikely for this contract to improve upon contingent debt.O n c e m o r e , t h e
advantage of contingent debt over this revelation game depends on the fact that the conﬂict among the parties is too
intense to be properly resolved with incentives such as giving the liquidation proceeds to charity.
16Assumption A.2 matters here: it implies that if straight debt guarantees ﬁnancing, E prefers to sign it rather
than doing nothing. Yet, the main features of contract choice remain valid, even if A.2 does not hold.
13choice and welfare are the same as in Proposition 1.
Under contractual freedom, ex post bargaining aﬀects the resolution of ﬁnancial distress very
little. The intuition is that the enforcement constraints restricting ex ante contracts also hold ex
post when renegotiation occurs. For example, when straight debt is optimal it is also renegotiation-
proof because E cannot pledge to I enough of the ﬁrm’s reorganization value to prevent liquidation
in U. Renegotiation only matters when contingent debt is optimal. Now it is optimal for I to
lend E the extra amount θ(L − αy2),w h i c ha l l o w sE to bribe I ex post so as to avoid the over
liquidation cost of courts’ imprecision. Yet, this contract is feasible only if courts are suﬃciently
precise (i.e. if θ ≤ θR (α)), otherwise I should lend so much as to undermine break even.17 Figure
3 plots contract choice and welfare as a function of (α,θ) as in Proposition 2:
















Broadly speaking, Figure 3 above rationalizes the empirical ﬁndings that more developed coun-
tries have a comparative advantage at writing more ﬂexible ﬁnancial contracts (Lerner and Schoar
2005, Qian and Strahan 2006) and at more ﬂexible resolutions of ﬁnancial distress (Djankov et
al. 2006). When investor protection is strong, the parties can commit to attaining an eﬃcient
resolution of ﬁnancial distress by writing ﬂexible convertibility clauses that allow the debtor to
pledge the ﬁrm’s reorganization value, not just certain physical assets, as collateral to the cred-
itor which induces him to internalize the upside from eﬃcient reorganization, thereby fostering
17Little changes if E has all the bargaining power. The Appendix shows that, with respect to Proposition 2,t h i s
change only reduces total repayment in G, thereby increasing the feasibility thresholds for all contracts.
14eﬃciency. When investor protection is low, conversion of debt into equity exposes the creditor to
the debtor’s massive tunnelling. In such circumstances, the only ex ante feasible solution is for
the parties to commit to always liquidate the ﬁrm piecemeal by writing more rigid straight debt
contracts, with standard foreclosure rights.
From a welfare standpoint, our key result is that higher legal protection against tunneling (α)
increases the eﬃciency of contractual resolutions of ﬁnancial distress. When α is low resolving the
conﬂict between the parties is very costly: debtors always want to reorganize so as to steal as much
as they can, which in turn induces creditors to prefer a quick piecemeal sale. As a result, ex post
ineﬃciencies are the price to pay for the creditor to break even. In addition, under contingent debt
welfare decreases in courts’ imprecision. In this respect, we conﬁrm the role of courts’ expertise in
enabling an eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial distress stressed by Ayotte and Yun (2006), although
here the result is derived in a model where contracts can explicitly provide the parties with suitable
monetary incentives to reveal their information.
3.2 Private Workouts in the Absence of Contractual Freedom
In the real world the contractual solutions of ﬁnancial distress described above are often not permit-
ted. For example, bankruptcy courts typically override convertibility clauses, and many bankruptcy
codes do not allow the use of ﬂoating charge ﬁnance (Djankov et al. 2006). More generally, many
countries regulate the resolution of ﬁnancial distress with mandatory bankruptcy procedures that
hinder the parties’ ability to deal with ﬁnancial distress by way of ex ante contracts. A natural
question is therefore to ask whether these legal constraints are actually binding. Do parties still
resolve ﬁnancial distress optimally despite the unavailability of contractual solutions? For example,
ex post private workouts are permitted: the parties can avoid using the state-supplied bankruptcy
procedure if they agree on a private workout after ﬁnancial distress has occurred. The question
then arises, even in a world with no contracting freedom, do these private workouts substitute for
ex ante contracting?
We address this question by comparing what private workouts can accomplish in a world without
contractual freedom to what the parties can attain when they are free to contract ex ante about
ﬁnancial distress. We characterize the absence of contractual freedom by assuming that the
bankruptcy code induces a certain liquidation/reorganization decision and a certain division of the
resulting proceeds among the parties, that is both “what to do with the ﬁrm” and “who gets what”
(Hart 2000). We do not model how the speciﬁc provisions of the bankruptcy code induce such
15outcomes. Our interest here is to take those outcomes as given and then ask, what can the parties
attain by renegotiating ex post in a private workout? We ﬁnd:
Corollary 1 If at some (α,θ) the state-mandated bankruptcy procedure induces a diﬀerent liqui-
dation/reorganization outcome than the optimal contract, then ex post workouts deliver lower social
welfare and/or lower average repayment to I than the optimal contract.
This result immediately follows from Proposition 2. The main diﬀerence between ex ante
contracts and ex post workouts is that while the former allow the parties to commit to an ex ante
optimal outcome, the latter only allow the parties to avoid ex post ineﬃciencies. If the state-
mandated procedure sometimes produces a diﬀerent liquidation/reorganization outcome than the
optimal contract, then either the workout fails because E is wealth constrained and the parties are
s t u c kw i t ha ni n e ﬃcient outcome, or the workout succeeds but then I must make some concessions
to E (relative to the optimal contract maximizing repayment to I), thereby reducing I’s repayment,
especially if E has a lot of bargaining power. Intuitively, this is because the optimal ex ante contract
maximizes ex post eﬃciency subject to I breaking even. In contrast, in an ex post workout the
parties do not care about break even and only bargain to reach ex post eﬃciency. Thus, workouts
may fail to guarantee I’s break even, especially if the state-mandated procedure is biased towards
ineﬃcient reorganization.
Corollary 1 implies that, in the absence of contractual freedom, workouts are unlikely to attain
the constrained optimal resolutions of distress attained under freedom of contracting. Of course,
if for every (α,θ) the state-mandated procedure is identical to the optimal ex ante contract, then
there is no welfare loss in abandoning contractual freedom. Unfortunately, this assumption does
not square with the way state-mandated procedures work in practice (Djankov et al. 2006). Thus,
our results indicate that increasing freedom of contracting as opposed to exclusively relying on state
intervention may increase the ex ante eﬃciency of the resolution of ﬁnancial distress. In particular,
our results indicate that optimal contractual resolutions of ﬁnancial distress must allow parties to
internalize the upside from eﬃcient reorganization. When investor protection is suﬃciently high,
two simple contracts sharing this key property are ﬂoating charge and convertible debt. Because
we obtained these results in the case of one creditor it is natural to ask, how would our conclusions
change were we to allow for multiple creditors?
164 Multiple Creditors
We now let the entrepreneur borrow from multiple creditors. Our goal is to address the often made
point that, absent state intervention in ﬁnancial distress, conﬂicts among multiple creditors would
necessarily trigger ineﬃcient outcomes. We study the three leading inter-creditor conﬂicts stressed
by bankruptcy scholars: In Section 4.1 we study the two conﬂicts among pre-existing creditors,
namely the conﬂict among multiple secured creditors leading to ineﬃcient runs on the ﬁrm’s assets
(e.g. Bulow and Shoven 1978, Jackson 1986), and the conﬂict between secured and unsecured
creditors, both leading to over-liquidation (e.g. Hart 1995, Manove, Padilla and Pagano 2001); in
Section 4.2 we allow for the arrival of new creditors and thus study the conﬂict between old and new
creditors leading to over- or under-investment in ﬁnancial distress (e.g. Gertner and Scharfstein
1991). In a regime of contractual freedom we thus ask, can E r e s o l v et h ea b o v ec o n ﬂicts and induce
an eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial distress by suitably designing the ﬁrm’s debt structure ex ante?
How does the optimal debt structure depend on investor protection against fraud?
We introduce multiple creditors by assuming that the ﬁrm’s physical assets feature constant
returns to scale and can be partially liquidated. That is, after liquidating a share f<1 of the
ﬁrm’s assets, total output is fL plus the continuation value (1 − f)y2 (ω). This assumption of
constant returns to scale simpliﬁes the algebra but is not crucial for our results.
4.1 Conﬂicts Among Existing Creditors and the Optimal Debt Structure
We now consider the conﬂict among secured creditors and the conﬂict between secured and unse-
cured creditors. First we present a numerical example to show that in our model under certain ex
ante debt structures both of these conﬂicts lead to over-liquidation. Then, we show that under the
optimal ex ante debt structure over-liquidation does not arise.
Example. Suppose that L =1 0 ,y 1 = 100, y2 =3 8 ,y 2 =6 ,α=1 /2.T h e e x p o s t e ﬃcient
resolution of distress is also ex ante optimal because it maximizes repayment to the creditors. The
maximum (ﬁrst and second period) payout to creditors in state G is (1/2)∗100+38 = 88. Suppose
that creditors as a group are owed 88 and the debt structure does not take ﬁnancial distress into
account. Furthermore, suppose that the multiplicity of creditors prevents them from bargaining ex
post. This assumption of no bargaining ex post is commonly invoked to justify state intervention
in ﬁnancial distress. The following two outcomes may then arise in ﬁnancial distress.
A (ineﬃcient run). There are two senior secured creditors. Each of them is entitled to a ﬁrst
17period repayment of 10. Each creditor can liquidate the ﬁrm’s physical assets and obtain 10 in case
of default. If both creditors exercise their liquidation rights, each of them gets 5. All other creditors
are unsecured. Clearly, this debt structure leads to eﬃcient liquidation in state B.C o n s i d e r n o w
state U. If both secured creditors wait until the second period, they share (1/2)∗38, each getting
9.5. If they both liquidate, each obtains 5.A sar e s u l t ,e ﬃcient continuation is socially proﬁtable
for them. Unfortunately, it is not in the creditors’ individual interest: if one creditor liquidates
and the other does not, the former obtains 10 and the second obtains nothing. This is an example
of a prisoner’s dilemma.A s a r e s u l t , i n s t a t e U there will be a run on the ﬁrm’s assets, leading
to ineﬃcient liquidation. This ineﬃciency arises because both creditors have liquidation rights on
t h es a m ep o o lo fa s s e t s .
B (lazy secured creditor). There is only one secured creditor, who has all the liquidation rights
and is entitled to a ﬁrst period repayment of 10. All other creditors are unsecured. This debt
structure leads to eﬃcient liquidation in B. Consider now state U. Irrespective of the outcome,
the secured creditor obtains 10. As a result, he has no particular incentive to reorganize the ﬁrm,
in spite of the fact that reorganization would beneﬁt creditors as a whole. The intuition is best seen
by assuming that the creditor is uninformed about the ﬁrm’s reorganization value but can acquire
information at a negligible, strictly positive cost. Clearly, the secured creditor has no beneﬁto f
acquiring information. Moreover, although reorganization is still eﬃcient on average because it
yields creditors (1/2)α(38 + 6) = 11 > 10, the uninformed secured creditor liquidates because he
only sees the downside of reorganizing, where he expects to get 6.5. This ineﬃciency arises because
the secured creditor’s payoﬀ is the same under liquidation and eﬃcient reorganization.
These examples illustrate two problems that may arise with many creditors. In both cases the
debt structure played an important role. In the ﬁrst case, there were too many liquidation rights.
In the second case, the repayment schedule of secured debt was too ﬂat across states.
4.1.1 Replicating the One-Creditor Outcome under Multiple Creditors
The above examples raise the question, can E avoid the above ineﬃciencies by issuing a suitable
debt structure ex ante? We then establish:
Proposition 3 E can replicate the optimal single-creditor outcome under n>1 creditors by con-
centrating in ﬁnancial distress all liquidation rights on one secured creditor. At every (α,θ), such
creditor is given the same type of debt contract that he would obtain in the single-creditor case.
18The rest of lending is raised from a number of secured and unsecured creditors. It is always possi-
ble for E to set repayment schedules sustaining the same resolution of ﬁnancial distress and total
repayment to creditors arising in the single-creditor case.
The one-creditor outcome can be replicated under n>1 creditors by simply concentrating
liquidation rights in ﬁnancial distress on one creditor and by suitably choosing his security and
collateral. As in the single-creditor case, if α is high this creditor is given convertible debt so
as to obtain (upon default) an equity stake in the reorganized ﬁrm;18 if α is intermediate such
creditor is given contingent debt, which still gives him a stake in the reorganized ﬁrm but adjusts
(through a debt write-down) the face value of his debt depending on courts’ assessment of the
ﬁrm’s reorganization value. If instead α is low, the creditor is given straight debt, with standard
foreclosure rights.19 The key feature of the debt structure avoiding inter-creditor conﬂicts is that
only one secured creditor is given the right to decide whether the ﬁrm is liquidated or reorganized
and it is given, by contract, the incentive to take an optimal decision. To see this, suppose that in
the numerical examples A and B above the ex ante debt structure was as follows:
There are two secured creditors, 1 and 2, each entitled to a ﬁrst period repayment of 10.I n
ﬁnancial distress, creditor 1 has the right to decide whether to liquidate or reorganize the ﬁrm. In
reorganization, debt is converted into equity and creditor 1 is given 1/2 of it, while the rest is given
to creditor 2.I fc r e d i t o r1 liquidates, he gets 6. N o t i c et h a tn o wi fc r e d i t o r1 reorganizes, he gets
(1/2) ∗ (1/2) ∗ 6=1 .5 in state B and (1/2) ∗ (1/2) ∗ 38 = 9.5 in state U. A sar e s u l t ,i fc r e d i t o r1
k n o w st h es t a t eh ei m p l e m e n t st h ee ﬃcient reorganization policy. Consistent with Proposition 4,
this debt structure eﬃciently resolves ﬁnancial distress and maximizes ex ante repayment. There
are neither ineﬃcient runs nor lazy creditors. In particular, even if creditor 1 is uninformed and
on average loses from reorganization (he gets less than 6), he is willing to spend more than 1.5
to obtain information about the ﬁrm’s reorganization value — thus, contracts can yield an optimal
18In practice, due to their monitoring advantage banks are likely candidates to play the role of the large, secured
creditor having control rights in ﬁnancial distress (e.g. Diamond 1984).
19Other debt structures, besides the one highlighted in Proposition 3, can replicate the single creditor case. In
particular, under the current assumption of constant returns to scale, one could trivially replicate the single-creditor
case by dividing the ﬁrm into n identical pieces, each ﬁnanced by a single creditor. We stress the centralized debt
structure of the proposition because its optimality does not hinge on the assumption of constant returns to scale and
because — as we shall see in Proposition 4 — the case for it is strengthened once one allows for renegotiation among
creditors. It is however important to stress that, for α suﬃciently large, any desirable debt structure uses our optimal
convertible debt contract. For instance, automatic conversion of debt into equity upon default does not improve
upon the debt structure of Proposition 3 for α>α
∗ ≡ L/y2 and it does strictly worse for α ∈ [α
∗,α C]. Indeed, as
already stressed in footnote 9, our convertible debt instrument is more eﬀective than automatic conversion at giving
the investor the incentive to eﬃciently resolve ﬁnancial distress.
19resolution of ﬁnancial even if, as stressed by Kahl (2002), something new is learned in ﬁnancial
distress.
This result suggests that creditor runs and lazy creditors are more likely the results of a sub-
optimal debt structure than intrinsic problems of ﬁnancial distress. In particular, our analysis
yields two key messages. First, ineﬃcient runs on the ﬁrm’s assets can be simply avoided by
concentrating liquidation rights on a single creditor. Such concentration does not imply that there
can only be one secured creditor in the debt structure: many other creditors can be secured in
the sense of having the right to obtain some liquidation proceeds. However, these other creditors
should not be allowed to unilaterally liquidate the ﬁrm’s physical assets, otherwise runs might
occur. It is precisely the concentration on a single creditor of the right to liquidate in part or
totally a ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrm that avoids ineﬃcient runs. Thus, ex post unanimity does not
necessarily follow from freedom of contracting, contrary to common wisdom (e.g. Jackson 1986).
Our second message is that giving the holder of liquidation rights a convertible security allows
him to internalize the social value of reorganization, thereby avoiding the lazy creditor problem and
resolving ﬁnancial distress eﬃciently. As a result, the desirable properties of the simple convertible
securities found in Section 3 in attaining an eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial distress appear to carry
over to the case of multiple creditors.
Of course, one objection to our results is that concentrating liquidation rights on one creditor
may be costly because such creditor may opportunistically use his power against other creditors
ex post.20 This issue is directly related to the possibility of ex post renegotiation, which was ruled
out in Proposition 3. For example, the holder of liquidation rights may threaten to ineﬃciently
reorganize an unproﬁtable ﬁrm, so as to force other creditors to accept an opportunistic distressed
exchange. On a diﬀerent note, while the current analysis suggests that it is possible to replicate the
single creditor outcome under multiple creditors, it is silent as to whether under multiple creditors
one can improve upon the single creditor outcome. To address these issues in the next section we
study the optimal debt structure with multiple creditors when renegotiation can occur.
20In principle, the creditor may also use his power against the debtor. For example, in order to obtain a larger
repayment, the holder of liquidation rights could threaten the debtor that he will precipitate ﬁnancial distress and
take over the ﬁrm. In our model, if the debtor chooses to repay his debt, there is no way in which the creditor can
precipitate ﬁnancial distress. However, even if such a threat was available, it would be easy to avoid it in our model.
Indeed, it is always possible to set the size of the equity stake and the repayment under liquidation low enough that
the creditor loses from ﬁnancial distress. As a result, the creditor does not want to precipitate it.
204.1.2 The Optimal Debt Structure
Before studying renegotiation among creditors, it is interesting to notice that in our model there
is a beneﬁt of creditor multiplicity, stemming from the possibility of separating the allocation of
liquidation rights and the allocation of liquidation proceeds. Such separation allows contracts to
divorce the provision of incentives from total repayment, thereby reducing the incentive costs of
convertible debt. As a result, under the optimal debt structure, the multiplicity of creditors may
improve upon the single creditor case.
To see this, suppose that αy2 <L . Then, with a single creditor ex post eﬃciency is attained
via a positive debt write-down S = L−αy2. This debt write-down reduces the creditor’s repayment
under liquidation, thereby reducing debt capacity. If instead E borrows from two secured creditors
but only one of them holds liquidation rights, S can be paid to the other creditor, and not to E.
Thus, in ﬁnancial distress creditors as a whole obtain:
(1/2)(αy2 + L). (5)
Comparing (5) and (3) shows that in addition to avoiding creditors’ runs the concentration of
liquidation rights also reduces the ex ante cost of convertible debt. Now debt capacity is unaﬀected
by incentive costs.
However, separation of liquidation and repayment rights is troubling under low protection
against tunneling. In particular, this is the case when α<α ∗ ≡ L/y2.I n t h i s c a s e αy2 <L
and creditors as a group lose from reorganization. Hence, if creditors as a group are entitled to
the full liquidation proceeds, they may collude against E and liquidate the ﬁrm in state U.T h i s
would reintroduce the ex ante cost of incentives. This is another reason for studying renegotiation
among creditors: if other creditors can bribe the holder of liquidation rights, it may be harder for
contracts to provide him with eﬃcient incentives.
Can the optimal debt structure, i.e. the relative number, size and type of claims, avoid or limit
the detrimental impact of ex post renegotiation among creditors? In the bankruptcy literature it
is often assumed that the of multiplicity of creditors makes renegotiation impossible or very costly
(e.g. Berglöf et al. 2003). We instead want to allow for some inter-creditor bargaining. To do
so, we assume that even with multiple creditors bargaining can take place within a coalition of
creditors, as long as such a coalition forms. Thus, to study such bargaining process we need to
specify a process of coalition formation among n>1 creditors. We assume:
21A.3: With n creditors, a coalition of s ≤ n of them forms with probability P(s|n)=
[n!/(n − s)!s!]/2n.
Under A.3 coalitions form by random assignment and, intuitively, if n is larger it becomes harder
to form an encompassing coalition of creditors. In Appendix A2.2 we relax assumption A.3 and
allow for endogenous consolidation of claims by any ("vulture") investors. Renegotiation works as
follows: after a coalition is formed, its members bargain over liquidation and all bargaining power
is held by the creditor holding liquidation rights (this assumption only simpliﬁes the analysis; what
matters for our results is that it is more diﬃcult to form a coalition as n increases). Under A.3,w e
ﬁnd:
Proposition 4 If α ≥ αC, E attains the ﬁrst best by giving all liquidation rights to a large secured
creditor who is given a share x of reorganization proceeds and must distribute an amount S =
L − xαy2 of liquidation proceeds to inﬁnitely many small creditors. If αS ≤ α<α C, E cannot do
better than committing to always liquidate by issuing straight debt contracts with standard foreclosure
rights to a number of secured creditors. If α<α S, the project is not ﬁnanced.
Under multiple creditors the parties can attain higher surplus than under a single creditor,
even if renegotiation is allowed, provided that the creditors without liquidation rights are fully
dispersed. Like in the debt structure of Proposition 3, all liquidation rights are given to a large
secured creditor lending under a convertible security. Once more, the convertible security induces
such creditor to internalize the upside of eﬃcient reorganization, thereby giving him incentives
to resolve ﬁnancial distress eﬃciently. Importantly, these very same incentives also prevent such
creditor from threatening other creditors that he will ineﬃciently reorganize or liquidate the ﬁrm,
so as to force them to accept an opportunistic distressed exchange. The intuition is that, because
the holder of liquidation rights has the incentive to put a ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrm to its most
eﬃcient use, his threats of doing the opposite are not credible.
Concentration of liquidation rights on the holder of convertible debt and dispersion of the
other claims improves upon the single creditor outcome by credibly separating liquidation and
repayment rights in ﬁnancial distress. This is best seen for α ∈ (αC,α ∗]. In this range, in the
single creditor case the parties attained the second best by using contingent debt. In contrast,
under multiple creditors the parties can attain the ﬁrst best. The intuition is that, even under
renegotiation, the parties can implement the same outcome of the two-creditors debt structure
above by reducing (relative to the no renegotiation case) the liquidation proceeds paid to the
22creditor holding liquidation rights and by dispersing the other claims. Reduction of his liquidation
proceeds maximizes the large creditor’s incentive to eﬃciently reorganize the ﬁrm. Debt dispersion
minimizes the probability of any given coalition of creditors having enough resources to bargain
with the holder of liquidation rights and bribe him to ineﬃciently liquidate. As a result, the optimal
debt structure delivers socially eﬃcient reorganization in state U even if creditors as a whole obtain
more (L) under liquidation. In Appendix A.2 we show that not only does debt dispersion discourage
the formation of large coalitions of creditors, but it also undermines the ability of any creditor to
buy out the other creditors’ claims in secondary markets. The intuition is that debt dispersion
gives rise to a typical holdout problem (Gertner and Scharfstein 1991).21
In sum, the optimal debt structure allows to attain the ﬁrst best and thus to improve upon
the one creditor case for α ∈ (αC,α ∗]. Now consider the other regions of the parameter space.
If α ≥ α∗, creditors as a whole beneﬁt from continuing the project when it is eﬃcient to do so.
Thus, the optimal debt structure is not renegotiated and attains the ﬁrst best, just like in the single
creditor case. If α<α C, not only does every creditor ﬁnd it optimal to always liquidate but it
is also eﬃcient to do so, because it is the only way to ensure break even. As a result, just like a
single creditor in this range, multiple creditors are given straight debt.22 Notice that in this case it
is not necessary to concentrate liquidation rights on one creditor. Now multiple secured creditors
could hold liquidation rights because the ﬁrm’s physical assets should always be liquidated upon
default.23 If α<α S, the project is not ﬁnanced.
So far we abstracted from the potential costs arising from creditors’ dispersion. For example,
Bris and Welch (2005) note that creditors’ dispersion may make them vulnerable to the debtor,
eventually undermining break even. In Appendix A2.3 we model this possibility by assuming that
debt dispersion makes it harder for creditors as a group to catch in court E’s divertive activity.
21In the Appendix A2.2 we show that under the optimal debt structure no consolidation can occur in equilibrium, be
it via a cash tender oﬀer or a distressed exchange. The intuition is that, to avoid holdout, the price of dispersed claims
in a secondary market must be equal to the amount of liquidation proceeds they command. Therefore, a creditor
launching a successful tender oﬀer, be it either the secured creditor holding liquidation rights, another secured or
unsecured creditor, or any third party will end up with zero surplus. As a result, if there is a negligible but strictly
positive cost to launch a tender oﬀer, then no creditor will want to consolidate the dispersed claims.
22Under multiple creditors, we have allowed for partial liquidation. Thus, for αS ≤ α<α C, break even is also
attained by a straight debt contract that in U and B liquidates a fraction f<1 of the project. Intuitively, partial
liquidation improves upon full liquidation if and only if over-liquidation is more costly than under-liquidation, i.e. if
L<(y2 + y
2)/2. See the Appendix for details.
23In a setting with unveriﬁable cash ﬂows (akin to α =0 ) Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue that debt dispersion
deters strategic default and increases debt capacity. We do not explicitly model this eﬀect but we note that, consistent
with our model, it would imply that for low α dispersion of liquidation rights is likely to be optimal. For high α
instead, deterring strategic default is less important and concentration of liquidation rights on one creditor is likely
to be optimal, again consistent with our model.
23Even in this case, the optimal debt structure concentrates liquidation rights on a large secured
creditor who is given contractual incentives to undertake an eﬃcient reorganization decision. The
main novelty with respect to the current analysis is that when creditor dispersion is moderately
costly (which occurs when investor protection against tunneling is intermediate), giving contingent
debt to the large secured creditor may be the optimal way to resolve ﬁnancial distress.24
Our results conﬁrm the idea that more developed countries have a comparative advantage at
more ﬂexible ﬁnancial contracts and more ﬂexible resolutions of ﬁnancial distress. More impor-
tantly, by using a simple debt structure, E can solve conﬂicts among existing creditors and attain
an eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial distress. The optimal debt structure has two ingredients. First,
liquidation rights should be concentrated on a large lender so as to avoid ineﬃcient runs on the
ﬁrm’s assets. Second, a large portion of the ﬁrm’s reorganization value should be pledged to such
lender under a convertible security, so as to maximize his incentives for eﬃcient reorganization.
Finally, the rest of the lending should be dispersed among many unsecured creditors, so as to limit
the scope of pro-liquidation coalitions against the debtor.
Remarkably, our optimal debt structure closely resembles the resolution of ﬁnancial distress
as carried out in the U.K. with the extensive use of ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing. Upon deciding for
reorganization, the ﬂoating charge holder leaves the management in control. Upon deciding for
liquidation, the ﬂoating charge holder usually appoints a professional agent, e.g. a receiver. In
turn, the receiver assumes all the powers of the company’s board of directors on behalf of the
ﬂoating charge holder (e.g. Davies 1997, p. 385). Because ﬁxed charges are usually senior to the
ﬂoating charge, large lenders such as banks often take both a ﬁxed and ﬂoating charge. The ﬂoating
charge gives the bank control rights over the reorganization decision and the ﬁxed charge gives it
seniority in liquidation, ahead of any preferential claims and unsecured creditors. The other claims
are then dispersed. As a result, Franks and Sussman (2005) note that there is no litigation in court,
there are no ineﬃcient runs, and the ﬂoating charge holder’s typical response to ﬁnancial distress
is an attempt to rescue the ﬁrm rather than to liquidate it automatically.
The empirical evidence shows that when it is allowed, the ﬂoating charge is widely used and
24From a theoretical standpoint, these results diﬀer from existing studies on the optimal ﬁnancial structure with
multiple investors. Typically this literature does not study how the optimal ﬁnancial structure varies with investor
protection. There are also other diﬀerences. For example, one strand of the literature focuses on multiple investors
holding diﬀerent claims, such as debt vs. equity (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994) and short-term debt vs. long-term
debt (Berglof and von Thadden 1994). These papers take ﬁnancial contracts as given and study how to combine
them in an optimal ﬁnancial structure. Instead, we derive at the same time the optimal contracts and the optimal
ﬁnancial structure. Winton (1995) derives the optimal mix of secured and unsecured claims as a function of exogenous
veriﬁcation costs. In our model, the costs of diﬀerent claims depend on investor protection.
24performs well (Djankov et al. 2006, Franks and Sussman 2005). Still the practical workings of
ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing depend on a variety of other institutions and legal restrictions. Even in
a country like the U.K. where the ﬂoating charge is allowed, the ﬂoating charge holder sometimes
cannot exercise full control upon default and other secured creditors may hamper his actions.25
These restrictions may counter the concentration of liquidation rights on the ﬂoating charge holder
and cause excessive liquidations, thereby limiting the eﬀectiveness of ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing.
In sum, the simple convertible security found optimal in the case with one creditor also helps to
eﬃciently resolve ﬁnancial distress under multiple creditors. A simple debt structure concentrating
liquidation rights on the holder of such security and dispersing all the other claims is shown to be
optimal, provided protection against fraud is strong enough.
4.2 Optimal Debt Structure with Arrival of New Creditors
Another argument often advanced to justify government intervention in bankruptcy pertains to the
possibility that the ﬁrm acquires new creditors as time passes (e.g. Hart 2000). The argument
goes that conﬂicts between old and new creditors might defy the parties’ attempt to contract about
ﬁnancial distress ex ante. Problems related to the sequential arrival of creditors naturally arise
when the ﬁrm faces new investment opportunities, especially if the ﬁrm is already in ﬁnancial
distress and thus needs to raise external ﬁnancing or to roll over current liabilities.26 In such
circumstances, the conﬂict between diﬀerent claimholders can be very intense, potentially resulting
in passing up proﬁtable investments opportunities or undertaking unproﬁtable ones (Myers 1977,
Jensen and Meckling 1976, Gertner and Scharfstein 1991). This section studies, in a regime of
contractual freedom, the properties of an ex ante optimal debt structure when the arrival of new
investment opportunities (and thus of new creditors) is taken into account. This analysis allows us
to evaluate how eﬃcient is the resulting resolution of ﬁnancial distress.
For concreteness, suppose that in ﬁnancial distress, before observing whether liquidation or
reorganization is eﬃcient (i.e. before deciding whether to reorganize or liquidate), the ﬁrm has the
opportunity to improve an existing line of business by investing F>0.T h ec a s hﬂow from such
25Franks and Nyborg (1996) cite the case of the building contractor, G. Dew, where the creditor with a ﬁxed charge
over plant and machinery placed a fence around the assets so that they could not be used by the receiver on behalf
of the ﬂoating charge holder, thereby precipitating liquidation. As we have shown in this Section, unanimity (or
supra-majority) provisions in resolving ﬁnancial distress may lead to over-liquidation by encouraging ineﬃcient runs
on the company’s assets.
26In our model, absent new investment opportunities new creditors need not arrive and the analysis of Sections
4.1 and 4.2 still applies, because borrowing does not serve insurance purposes. See Bisin and Rampini (2006) for a
model where borrowing from new creditors serves insurance purposes.
25investment is r ≥ 0. If the investment is undertaken, continuation cash ﬂows increase to y2(ω)+r,
liquidation cash ﬂows are constant at L. We assume that even if investment takes place, in state
B liquidation is more eﬃcient than reorganization:
A.4: y2 + r<L .
Assumption A.4 simpliﬁes the analysis by positing that the eﬃciency of reorganization versus
liquidation is unaﬀected by the investment decision. Because the investment only pays oﬀ in U,i t
is socially optimal to invest if and only if r ≥ 2F. We now present a numerical example showing
that, related to the ﬁrm’s possibility of ﬁnancing this investment opportunity, the classical over
and under-investment problems can arise in our model under sub-optimal debt structures.
Example. Consider the case where L =3 0 ,y 1 = 100, y2 =9 0 ,y 2 =1 0 ,α=1 /2. Suppose
that the debt structure speciﬁes a face value of debt of 40, equally distributed across 10 creditors
with equal priority. Once more, suppose that the multiplicity of creditors prevents them from
bargaining ex post with the debtor. To keep things simple (but without aﬀecting the results),
suppose that creditors must decide whether to reorganize or continue the ﬁrm: under the chosen
parameter values they will have an incentive to take the eﬃcient decision, i.e. to reorganize if and
only if it is eﬃcient to do so. The following outcomes may then arise in ﬁnancial distress:
C (under-investment). Suppose that the investment decision requires creditors’ unanimity.
Suppose that F =6 , r =2 0and that ﬁnancing must be provided by a new creditor. Investment is
socially eﬃcient, but the new creditor can only break even if his claim has higher priority than exist-
ing claims. Consider the preferences of existing creditors. If investment takes place, each of the old
creditors obtains 24/10 under liquidation and 40/10 under eﬃcient reorganization, for an expected
value of 3.2. If instead investment does not take place, each of the old creditors obtains 30/10 under
liquidation and 40/10 under eﬃcient reorganization, for an expected value of 3.5.S i n c e3.5 > 3.2,
existing creditors unanimously decide not to invest. This is the classic debt overhang problem:
because existing creditors do not internalize the upside of proﬁtable investment opportunities, they
veto supra-priority ﬁnancing and thus forego proﬁtable investment opportunities.
D (over-investment). Suppose, in contrast with case C above, that the debtor has the exclusive
power to allow supra-priority ﬁnancing and suppose that F =6 , r =1 , so that the new investment
is socially ineﬃcient. Consider the preferences of the debtor. If investment takes place, the debtor
obtains zero under liquidation and 45.5 under eﬃcient reorganization, for an expected value of 22.75.
If instead investment does not take place, the debtor still obtains zero under liquidation but now
26obtains only 45 under eﬃcient reorganization, for an expected value of 22.5.S i n c e 22.75 > 22.5,
the debtor decides to invest. This is the classical asset substitution problem: because the debtor
only sees the upside and not the downside of the investment opportunity, he tries to allow supra
priority ﬁnancing and thus to invest too often, even if the investment is socially ineﬃcient.
These examples illustrate that the arrival of a new creditor whose claim competes with those
of existing ones may create two problems. First, as long as existing creditors cannot fully beneﬁt
from the upside of new investment opportunities, they may veto the undertaking of proﬁtable
investments. This is the classic under-investment problem (or debt overhang, Myers 1977). Second,
because equityholders only see the upside of the new investment, they want to invest even if the
NPV is negative (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The question then arises, can E improve upon these
cases by issuing a suitable debt structure ex ante?
We focus on the case F ≤ L/2, where under the ﬁrst best liquidation/reorganization policy the
new investment can be ﬁnanced at every α.I fi nﬁnancial distress debtors cannot pledge enough
r e s o u r c e ss oa st oﬁnance the new investment, then new creditors are unwilling to lend and the
problems we just discussed do not arise. We also allow for the possibility that the return r of
the investment is uncertain at t =0 . As a result, the initial debt structure can only specify a
mechanism for taking future reﬁnancing decisions. We establish:
Proposition 5 There exists a αN and a pair (S,x) such that, if α ≥ αN, E attains the ﬁrst best
by giving ex ante all the rights to liquidate and to allow supra priority ﬁnance in ﬁnancial distress
to a large secured creditor who is given a share x of the reorganization proceeds. The reorganization
proceeds accruing to such creditor are reduced by the amount 2xαD,w h e r eD is the amount of supra
priority ﬁnance issued in ﬁnancial distress. All other claims are dispersed. In case of liquidation,
such creditor must distribute a total amount S to old and new creditors. For α<α N supra priority
ﬁnance is forbidden and the optimal debt structure is the same as that of Proposition 4.
With little changes, the optimal debt structure of Proposition 4 can attain full eﬃciency also
when a ﬁrm needs to acquire new creditors to ﬁnance investment opportunities in ﬁnancial distress.
Now the optimal debt structure gives to the large secured creditor also the right to allow supra
priority ﬁnancing (and thus to invest), on top of the right to liquidate the ﬁrm. The optimal debt
structure avoids under-investment because conversion of debt into equity allows such a creditor to
beneﬁt from the upside of new investments. At the same time, lowering the reorganization proceeds
obtained by such creditor for an amount proportional to the new debt issued avoids over-investment
27by inducing him to internalize the investment cost. The large secured creditor is given discretion
to raise new funds but the ﬂexible debt structure makes him residual claimant to the NPV of the
new investment, thereby fostering an eﬃcient re-ﬁnancing decision.
Importantly, just like poor investor protection against fraud creates a tension between eﬃcient
reorganization and ex ante break even, so it does with respect to new investment opportunities.
When α is low, arrival of new creditors seriously undermines the ability of existing ones to obtain
repayment. In such cases, the optimal debt structure should forbid new investments so as to
guarantee ex ante break even. As a result, our model yields the novel prediction that under-
investment in ﬁnancial distress should be more severe in countries with poor investor protection.
In an important paper, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) show that both under- and over-
investment problems can arise in ﬁnancial distress. They argue that a reorganization procedure such
as U.S. Chapter 11, putting an automatic stay on the ﬁrm’s assets, keeping existing management in
control and lifting unanimity restrictions on the approval of supra-priority ﬁnancing will unambigu-
osly increase investment, thereby reducing or even eliminating the extent of the under-investment
problem, but possibly increasing the extent of the over-investment problem.
Our analysis conﬁrms that both creditors’ runs on the ﬁrm’s assets and unanimity rules are
likely to create conﬂicts between old and new creditors, thereby worsening under- or over-investment
problems. In addition, we show that these problems are more likely due to an ex ante suboptimal
debt structure rather than being an intrinsic problem of ﬁnancial distress. As long as contracts
can freely allocate both liquidation and re-ﬁnancing rights to a large secured lender, suitably de-
signed convertible debt or ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing contracts yield an eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial
distress even in the absence of formal, judicially administered reorganization procedures.
The analysis of the multiple creditor case thus conﬁrms the potential for the parties to eﬃciently
resolve ﬁnancial distress with simple debt contracts, as opposed to entirely rely on state intervention.
Remarkably, for strong investor protection the same convertible security is the pillar of the optimal
debt structure, under both a single and multiple creditors. With multiple creditors, the optimal
debt structure also features concentration of liquidation, and re-ﬁnancing rights and debt dispersion.
5N o r m a t i v e I m p l i c a t i o n s
In most societies the resolution of ﬁnancial distress is directly regulated by the government with
mandatory bankruptcy procedures, rather than being resolved contractually as in our model. These
28state-mandated procedures are often an elaborate, court supervised process producing substantial
delays and ineﬃciencies (e.g. Hart 1995, Franks, Nyborg and Torous 1996), and imposing large
administrative costs on the parties. Crucially, state-mandated procedures often explicitly prevent
parties from contracting about ﬁnancial distress.27
Our theoretical results suggest that there might be substantial beneﬁts of increasing contrac-
tual freedom as opposed to exclusively rely on state intervention in resolving ﬁnancial distress. A
bankruptcy reform lifting legal restrictions to ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing, convertibles, concentration
of liquidation rights, and at the same time increasing legal protection against tunneling would
allow the parties to eﬀectively use our optimal debt structures. Such an increase in freedom of
contracting would not undermine public regulation of ﬁnancial distress in case it is eﬃcient, but it
would unleash the potential of private contracts, remedying the deﬁciencies of ineﬃcient govern-
ment intervention. Such a "contractual" bankruptcy reform is likely to reduce court involvement,
streamline the resolution of ﬁnancial distress, and thus increase debt capacity and social welfare,
especially in developing countries.
Section 5.1 discusses in detail the proposals for bankruptcy reform emerging from our model.
Section 5.2 relates the contractual resolution of distress we advance to leading academic proposals
for bankruptcy reform.
5.1 Suggestions for Bankruptcy Reform
Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 examine concrete strategies for eﬀectively increasing freedom of contract
and investor protection against fraud, respectively.
5.1.1 Freedom of Contracting
At a broad level, our analysis indicates — in the spirit of Rasmussen (1992) and Schwartz (1997)
— that allowing entrepreneurs and investors to contractually opt out of state-provided bankruptcy
procedures increases the eﬃciency of resolutions of ﬁnancial distress. More in detail, our model
identiﬁes two speciﬁc ingredients for an optimal resolution of ﬁnancial distress: the use of convertible
securities and the concentration of liquidation rights.
In reality, parties face strong legal restrictions to resolve ﬁnancial distress by using convertibil-
27The presence of such legal restrictions to private contracts is often rationalized with political economy conﬂicts
between lenders and borrowers (e.g. Bolton and Rosenthal 2002) or among competitors in an industry (e.g. Feijen
and Perotti 2006).
29ity clauses and ﬂoating charge ﬁnance. For example, convertibility clauses are often overridden by
bankruptcy courts, especially in civil law countries (e.g. Lerner and Schoar 2005). Most signiﬁ-
cantly, ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing is simply not allowed in many countries in the world. As Djankov,
Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) show, this is mostly associated with civil law countries, whereby
highly formalistic bankruptcy codes require that collateral be only certain physical assets and not
the ﬁrm’s full reorganization value (including bank accounts, intangibles, working capital and future
cash ﬂows). As a result, we believe that bankruptcy codes should be reformed toward allowing
the parties to use ﬂoating charge ﬁnance and convertibility clauses. Consistent with this view and
with our model, the evidence indicates that, when allowed, ﬂoating charge ﬁnance is widely used
and facilitates an eﬃcient resolution of ﬁnancial distress (Djankov et al. 2006).28
In addition, parties face strong legal restrictions also to concentrating liquidation and re-
ﬁnancing rights on a single large lender. For example, several real world bankruptcy codes allow
failed debtors to unilaterally ﬁle for state-provided reorganization procedures. In turn, bankrupt
debtors enjoy an automatic stay on the secured assets, which prevents any creditor from repos-
sessing collateral upon default. At the other extreme, other bankruptcy codes require ex post
unanimity (or supra-majority) of creditors to reorganize a failed ﬁrm. Our model suggests that
such dispersion of liquidation rights may be responsible for over- and under-liquidation and under-
investment in ﬁnancial distress. As a result, another key step toward making contracts work would
be to reform bankruptcy codes in the direction of allowing the parties to contract out of ex post
unanimity and other voting rules.29
5.1.2 Legal Protection against Tunneling
Our model also shows that contractual resolutions of ﬁnancial distress are most eﬃcient when
investor protection against fraud is strong. Broadly speaking, this argument conﬁrms that bank-
28Notice that whether bankruptcy reform should more urgently focus on allowing ﬂoating charge or convertible
debt may well depend on the country’s legal infrastructure. For example, while ﬂoating charge and convertible debt
share the need for strong, general legal protection against fraud, they are likely to diﬀer as to the extent to which
they rely on diﬀerent aspects of such legal protection. Speciﬁcally, while convertible debt needs to rely on both
strong creditor protection and strong shareholder protection, ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing relies more on strong creditor
protection. As a result, allowing ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing may be a more eﬀective policy in those countries, like
Germany, where creditor protection is much stronger than shareholder protection.
29Upholding private contracts also requires respecting the priority of secured creditors. In practice, bankruptcy
procedures often violate the priority of secured creditors with respect to both unsecured creditors and equity holders,
so the latter get repaid something even if the former are not repaid in full (e.g. Franks and Torous 1989, Weiss 1990).
In the context of our model, one might interpret the optimal debt write down as a beneﬁcial violation of the large
creditor’s absolute priority. However, this interpretation fails to recognize that such debt write down (or forgiveness)
is stipulated in the ex ante contract and thus does not constitute a violation of priority.
30ruptcy reform should not be viewed in isolation: it may be necessary to combine it with other
reforms, such as improvements in corporate governance and the strengthening of investor rights.
Indeed, investor protection against tunneling does not only depend on bankruptcy laws; it reﬂects
more broadly the quality of a country’s legal system as reﬂected by general anti self-dealing laws
(Djankov et al. 2005) and securities laws (La Porta et al. 2006).
However, bankruptcy codes also play a direct fundamental role in fostering investor protection
against tunneling, over and above securities and anti self-dealing laws. On the one hand, bankruptcy
codes allow parties to write restrictive covenants or directly forbid dividend payments in ﬁnancial
distress in their debt contracts. These contractual protections are especially useful for large and
sophisticated lenders such as banks. On the other hand, by providing speciﬁca n t is e l f - d e a l i n g
provisions known as fraudulent transfer law, bankruptcy codes set a default level of protection that
is especially important to protect small, dispersed and unsophisticated investors — precisely those
who are least likely to take advantage of contractual protections (e.g. Kraakman 2006).
Fraudulent transfer law is a key component of investor protection against fraud. For example,
Baird (2006) argues that fraudulent transfer law was the key tool for unraveling many transactions
in Enron. The usual reason for speciﬁc fraudulent transfer law is to reach more directly transactions
made by ﬁrms in the vicinity of ﬁnancial distress. Put diﬀerently, some self-dealing transactions
can be particularly harmful because they can trigger ﬁnancial distress and the ultimate winding up
of the company.30
Our model then suggests that bankruptcy reform should strengthen, especially in developing
countries, fraudulent transfers law so as to increase investor protection, especially for small, unso-
phisticated creditors. This may call for seeking strict avoidance of fraudulent conveyances, placing
the burden of proof and personal liability on directors, and maximizing mandated disclosure. Such
reform would maximize the parties’ ability to contract about ﬁnancial distress, thereby fostering
30One relevant form of tunneling in ﬁnancial distress is the strategic acquisition of personal assets by the debtor with
the creditors’ money. For example, three Enron executives started building million-dollar homes in Texas with Enron
money before the Enron bankruptcy ﬁling, because in Texas “the law permits a debtor to fraudulently invest ill-gotten
gains in a homestead to beat his or her creditor” (LoPucki 2005, p. 150). Consistent with this example, Berkowitz
and White (2004) document that, across U.S. states, greater homestead exemption in bankruptcy is associated
with reduced access to credit by small ﬁrms. The magnitude of these problems is likely to be much ampliﬁed in
emerging economies, where underﬁnanced, incompetent or even corrupt courts cannot be expected to eﬀectively
resolve diﬃcult cases of managerial self-dealing, thereby reducing the debtors’ ability to pledge their business to
creditors. Interestingly, however, even advanced economi e sa r er e f o r m i n gt h e i rf r a u d u l e n tc o n v e y a n c el a w st oc a t c h
managerial self dealing in ﬁnancial distress. For example, the 2005 U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act has raised from one
to two years the look-back period for fraudulent conveyances. In addition, in the context of the British Insolvency
Act, Davies (2006) argues that fraudulent transfer law allows recovery from the directors by the liquidator on the
part of creditors generally, whereas general anti-fraud law provides only for individual recovery, e.g. Morphitis v.
Bernasconi [2003] 2 BCLC 53.
31eﬃciency, especially in developing countries.
To sum up, our analysis provides some guidance for bankruptcy reform by highlighting which
ex ante contracts optimally resolve ﬁnancial distress at diﬀerent levels of investor protection. A
direct implication of our ﬁndings is that there may be signiﬁcant beneﬁts in lifting existing legal
restrictions on the use of ﬂoating charge and concentration of liquidation rights. Of course, we are
not saying that this is the only reform capable of improving the resolution of ﬁnancial distress. For
example, a bankruptcy reform mimicking our optimal contracts of Figure 3 could substitute for an
explicit and broad enactment of freedom of contracting. It should be noted however that such an
alternative reform would require the implementation of an entire menu of bankruptcy procedures,
each replicating a speciﬁc optimal private contract, because the optimal contract typically varies
across diﬀerent ﬁrms, even for a common level of investor protection.31 This suggests that such
bankruptcy reform would be de-facto equivalent to lifting legal restrictions by allowing the par-
ties to use a full range of standardized contracts. In addition, such reform should necessarily be
complemented by the removal of existing legal restrictions forbidding parties to contract ex ante
on which bankruptcy procedure to use, especially if ﬁrm characteristics are not fully observable.
Thus, one way or another, our ﬁndings explicitly call for an increase in contracting freedom (or
ﬂexibility) relative to most current state-mandated procedures.32
31Indeed, Section 3 showed that for α ≥ α
∗ ≡ L/y2 convertible debt allows the parties to attain the ﬁrst best.
As a result, ﬁrms diﬀering in their potential beneﬁtf r o me ﬃcient reorganization naturally diﬀer, for a given level of
α, on their way of optimally resolving ﬁnancial distress. Ceteris paribus, start-up high-tech ﬁrms who cannot rely
heavily on physical collateral and where the debtor in possession is likely to have a signiﬁcant advantage in running
the reorganized ﬁrm (i.e. where y2 is much larger than L), should be expected to use more sophisticated and ﬂexible
contractual arrangements such as convertible debt to resolve ﬁnancial distress. By contrast, ﬁrms in mature industries
such as real estate and utilities where physical assets represent a large proportion of total assets (i.e. where y2 is very
close to L), will face relatively larger incentive costs of using sophisticated contractual instrument and thus are more
likely to use simpler contracts such as straight debt that approximate the ﬁrst best by contractually committing to
liquidate a ﬁnancially distressed project.
32It is often argued that state-mandated bankruptcy procedures do better than private contracts if anything new
(e.g. about a ﬁrm’s continuation or liquidation value) is learned between the time the contract is signed and the
time ﬁnancial distress arises. We disagree. Our model shows that, as long as the parties are ex ante aware of the
possibility of learning something new in the future (a necessary assumption for drawing welfare implications), then the
parties can contractually delegate a third party (e.g. a court) to enforce the contract by taking into account the new
information. This possibility is obvious in our contingent debt contract, whereby the parties voluntarily surrender to
the judge the task of estimating the ﬁrm’s reorganization value. More generally, it is unclear why the parties cannot
allow in their ex ante contract for the same degree of ex post ﬂe x i b i l i t ya l l o w e df o rb ya ne xa n t eb a n k r u p t c yl a w .
As an example, consider the case of tort creditors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to exhaustively cover this
issue, but one observation helps illustrate the point. If the ﬁrm operates in an environment associated with potential
tort claims (e.g. asbestos) it might optimally allocate a reserve (or insurance) should the need to settle such claims
arise ex post; in fact, tort claims can be seen as negative random shocks to the ﬁrm’s current and future cash ﬂows.
Clearly, the resulting optimal debt structure might end up having fewer (or weaker) security rights than in the case
without tort claims, but its welfare properties would be unchanged.
325.2 Contracts and Academic Proposals for Bankruptcy Reform
We conclude this section by discussing how the contractual solution to ﬁnancial distress we advance
is related to existing academic proposals for bankruptcy reform. We consider the Bebchuk (1988)
and Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992, AHM henceforth) proposals for using options, Jensen’s (1989)
proposal for using cash auctions and proposals for using judicial expertise (Bolton and Rosenthal
2002 and Ayotte and Yun 2006). In this respect, we show that our model allows us to evaluate the
eﬃciency of these proposals as a function of contracting frictions (α,θ).
5.2.1 Options
The basic idea goes as follows. First, when a ﬁrm goes bankrupt, all the ﬁrm’s debts are cancelled,
and all claims are converted into equity. Then, in line with Bebchuk (1988), former claim-holders
are either allocated equity in the new company (in the case of senior creditors) or given an option
to buy equity (in the case of junior creditors or shareholders), according to the amount/priority
of their claims. Then, cash and non-cash bids are solicited for all or part of the new ﬁrm. After
the options have expired, the new shareholders vote on whether to select one of the cash bids
or maintain the company as a going concern, either under existing management or under some
alternative management team. The ﬁrm then exits from bankruptcy.
In the context of our model, this scheme amounts to: 1) giving E (i.e. the only shareholder)
the option to post a non-cash bid of αy2 to buy back the ﬁrm from I − by exercising the option,
E avoids liquidation and continues the project33, 2) giving I a convertible security whereby debt
is converted into equity when E exercises the option and reorganizes. This procedure shares some
features with our convertible debt contract where in ﬁnancial distress the debtor is allowed to
reorganize by pledging the ﬁrm’s equity to the investor. As a result, our model can be seen as
rationalizing the optimality of some features of the AHM procedure in an ex ante contracting model
(which in addition shows the possibility of attaining ex post eﬃciency with other mechanisms).
Notice, however, that our explicit consideration of ex ante eﬃciency addresses two key issues not
a d d r e s s e db yA H M ,w h oo n l yp e r f o r m e da ne xp o s ta n a l y s i s . F i r s t ,ad e b tw r i t e - d o w ni so f t e n
needed to provide the parties with appropriate incentives to undertake the eﬃcient reorganization
decision (e.g. to prevent E from always reorganizing). Second, sophisticated mechanisms like the
33As stressed by Bebchuk and AHM, options serve two roles. First, options are one way to endogenously reveal
information of the project’s continuation value. Second, options are one way to preserve absolute priority. Because
we focus only on the former, to map the AHM proposal into our model it does not matter whether there is only one
or many creditors.
33one proposed by AHM are only optimal and feasible at high levels of investor protection. At lower
levels investor protection, some court intervention or even straight debt are preferable because they
facilitate investor break even.
5.2.2 Cash Auctions
Another proposal for bankruptcy reform is to put bankrupt ﬁrms on the block, collect cash bids
from the public and sell the ﬁrm to the highest bidder (Baird 1986; Jensen 1989). The highest
bidder then takes control of the ﬁrm, and decides whether to keep it as going concern, or liquidate
it piecemeal. It is usually believed that such a procedure, known as a “reformed Chapter 7”, looks
very much like the Swedish Konkurslagen, where bankrupt ﬁrms are often sold as going concerns.
The most appealing feature of cash auctions is that the bidding aggregates all available information
concerning the reorganization value of the ﬁrm (in particular relative to estimates of its liquidation
value). This way, parties make an eﬃcient liquidation versus continuation decision.
In our simple framework, cash auctions are tantamount to the availability of ﬁnancial markets
pricing for the reorganization value of the ﬁrm, so as to let insiders raise money to ﬁnance their
bids. One could thus wonder how cash auctions compare with private contracts. In our framework,
allowing insiders to raise cash from public (stock) markets to ﬁnance a cash bid is likely to result
either in over-continuation if protection against fraud is high or in over-liquidation otherwise. The
intuition is that ﬁnancial markets, being uninformed, will lend an amount that reﬂects only the
expected not the actual value of the reorganized ﬁrm. Thus, insiders will decide to raise money
from ﬁnancial markets and bid if and only if the expected value of the reorganized ﬁrm to outsiders





≥ L. If insiders successfully post the bid, then
the ﬁrm is reorganized even if liquidation is eﬃcient (unless there is ex post renegotiation with
creditors). If instead creditor protection is low and insiders cannot post the bid, then the ﬁrm is
over-liquidated. This argument shows that a problem of cash auctions is that — unlike options or
contracts — they crucially rely on the availability of ﬁnancial market pricing.
5.2.3 Courts
Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) and Ayotte and Yun (2006) advocate the optimality of third party
intervention in resolving ﬁnancial distress, even if such intervention is imprecise, leading to too
many bail outs and reorganizations. Our model provides the intuition for the optimality of judicial
interventions as a function of investor protection.
34In particular, if protection against tunneling is intermediate, it is optimal for debt contracts
to use judicial expertise in resolving ﬁnancial distress. Although our ﬁnding does not pin down
how exactly courts should intervene in a bankruptcy procedure, we stress, in line with Bolton and
Rosenthal (2002) and Ayotte and Yun (2006) that use of judicial expertise may be optimal. Unlike
Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) and Ayotte and Yun (2006) who advocate court intervention on the
grounds that it allows to make the resolution of ﬁnancial distress contingent on ex ante unveriﬁable
information, we rationalize court intervention as a way of avoiding the ex ante cost of incentives.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We study the economics of optimal resolution of ﬁnancial distress in an ex ante model of contract-
ing. We ﬁnd that convertible debt structures that concentrate liquidation rights on one creditor
and induce that same creditor to internalize the upside of eﬃcient reorganization are optimal, es-
pecially at high levels of investor protection. At one level, our results rationalize in an optimal
contracting setup the optimality of ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing − we are not aware of any theoretical
paper doing so. At another level, our results indicate that to increase the eﬃciency of resolutions
of ﬁnancial distress one bankruptcy reform relatively easy to implement is to foster freedom of
contracting, in particular by allowing contracts to use ﬂoating charge ﬁnancing and convertibility
clauses, and to concentrate liquidation rights. Because we ﬁnd that these contractual provisions
are most eﬀective when investor protection is strong, such a bankruptcy reform should be optimally
combined with improvements in investor protection. These reforms would unleash the potential of
private contracts, thereby decreasing the need to exclusively rely on state intervention to resolve
ﬁnancial distress eﬃciently.
Based on our analysis, one might be tempted to conclude that there are no beneﬁts at all of
government intervention in corporate bankruptcy. We wish to warn the reader against jumping too
quickly to this conclusion. Our analysis simply suggests that the ineﬃciencies typically stressed
by bankruptcy scholars can be resolved with relatively simple debt contracts and that, as a result,
legal restrictions preventing the parties from using such contracts are likely to undermine eﬃciency.
However, there might be other reasons beyond those often advocated in the bankruptcy literature
why contracts may fail (Aghion and Hermalin 1990) and some public regulation of ﬁnancial distress
may be needed. For example, as stressed by Bolton and Rosenthal (2002), in economic crises the
resolution of ﬁnancial distress in a given ﬁrm may generate large externalities on other ﬁrms or
35workers. In such circumstances, the possibility of complementing private contracts with govern-
ment intervention through a soft bankruptcy law may help avoid excessive liquidations, thereby
facilitating economic recovery.
Although our main focus is normative, our theory does oﬀer several novel empirical predictions
that could be tested in future work. For example, our theory provides the novel implication that,
ceteris paribus, the incidence of unsecured debt in the debt structure should increase with investor
protection across countries. Because investor protection reduces the relative ability of debtors to
steal from cash ﬂows, only when investor protection is strong can creditors with no right to physical
collateral expect to be repaid, and are thus willing to lend. Additionally, our theory implies that
the extent of the underinvestment problem should decrease with investor protection.
Our model also delivers the implication that the extent of debt dispersion should increase with
investor protection across countries. While to the best of our knowledge not explicitly formulated
before in the literature, one could however obtain these implications also in the framework of Bris
and Welch (2005), were one to interpret their cost of debt collection as “investor protection”.
This prediction contrasts with the popular view that debt dispersion hardens the debtor’s budget
constraint and increases debt capacity (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996), the more so in countries
with poor investor protection (Diamond 2004). Clearly, the empirical correlation between investor
protection and the extent of debt dispersion is an interesting avenue for future research.
36Appendix 1: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . I advances D ≥ K to E under ﬁrst and second period repayments
d1(ω;a), d2(ω;a), ω = G,U,B and liquidation policy λ(ω;a); ω is the state, a is the parties’ action
proﬁle, including E’s decision to repay and the decision to liquidate or reorganize. The parties can
delegate the latter decision to one of them (possibly in a state contingent manner). For notational
simplicity, in the proofs we will often omit to indicate the dependence of the optimal contract terms
on a. Feasibility requires d1(ω) ≤ αy1(ω)+λ(ω)L, d2(ω) ≤ αy2(ω), λ(ω) ∈ {0,1}.
Suppose that I lends D = K.C o n s i d e rs t a t eG ﬁrst. To avoid ex post ineﬃciencies, the parties
set λ(G)=0 . The incentive compatible repayments d1(G),d 2(G) satisfy:
y1 − d1(G)+y2 − d2(G) ≥ y1 + λ(G;NR)L − d1(G;NR)+[ 1− λ(G;NR)]y2 − d2(G;NR).
NR indicates that E defaulted on d1(G). E’s default payoﬀ is minimized at λ(G;NR)=1 ,
d1(G;NR)=L+αy1. This yields d1(G)+d2(G) ≤ αy1+y2.T h u s ,i nG no strategic default occurs
and I can extract at most d1(G)=αy1 +(1−α)y2, d2(G)=αy2. Consider optimal contract terms
for B and U. We must consider the following possibilities. 1) E controls liquidation/reorganization.
Call dL the liquidation proceeds going to I after 0 ﬁrst period cash ﬂows. Then, E liquidates in
B if L − dL ≥ y2 − d2(B) and reorganizes in U if y2 − d2(U) ≥ L − dL.S i n c e d2(ω) ≤ αy2(ω)
and dL ≤ L, I’s payoﬀ is maximized at d2(B)=αy2, d2(U)=αy2 and dL = L − (1 − α)y2.
This contract eﬀectively gives I the ﬁrm’s assets upon default. E can get (1 − α)y2 and let I
liquidate or he can buy back the ﬁrm (and reorganize) by making a non-cash bid of αy2. 2)
I controls liquidation/reorganization. I decides eﬃciently provided dL ≥ d2(B), d2(U) ≥ dL.
Subject to ex post eﬃciency, I’s payoﬀ is maximized at d2(B)=αy2, d2(U)=αy2, dL = L −
max[L − αy2,0]. After zero ﬁrst period cash ﬂows, this contract eﬀectively stipulates a debt write-
down reducing repayment to dL,p l e d g e st oI reorganization proceeds and lets him decide over
liquidation/reorganization. Because contracts 2 and 3 give I claims on the ﬁrm’s reorganization
value in ﬁnancial distress, we call them convertible debt (CO henceforth). CO guarantees full ex
post eﬃciency. In terms of ex ante eﬃciency, repayment to I under CO falls as α goes down. In
general, there exists a threshold αCO such that CO is feasible (either in version 1 or in version 2)
iﬀ α ≥ αCO.
Another set of contracts uses court’s ability to estimate the ﬁrm’s reorganization value. Con-
sider these contracts. 3) E controls liquidation/reorganization but dL(ω) is state-contingent. A
37schedule dL(B)=L − (1 − α)y2, dL(U)=L maximizes repayment. This contract is dominated
by 1 both ex post and ex ante. 4) I controls liquidation/reorganization but dL(ω) is contingent.
The optimal debt write-down is S(B)=0 , S(ω)=m a x[ L − αy2,0]. To stress the state-contingent
debt write-down, we call this contract contingent debt (CD henceforth). There exists a threshold
αCD such that CD is feasible iﬀ α ≥ αCD. Yet, under CD there is an ex post over-liquidation
cost of (1 − π)(1/2)θ(y2 − L). 5) It is never optimal to give courts the right to control liqui-
dation/reorganization. I gets L under liquidation, αy2 (ω) under continuation. The average ex
post loss under this contract is (1−π)(1/2)θ(y2 −y2), which is larger than the loss under CD and
repayment to I is smaller.
Consider contracts mandating a non-contingent liquidation/reorganization policy. 6) The
contract stipulates λ(B)=λ(U)=1 , dL = L.T h i si sstraight debt (SD henceforth). There exists
a threshold αS such that SD is feasible iﬀ α ≥ αS. Ex post losses are now (1 − π)(1/2)(y2 − L).
7) Parties write λ(B)=λ(U)=0 , d2(ω)=αy2(ω). Ex post losses are (1 − π)(1/2)(L − y2).T h i s
contract is dominated both ex ante and ex post by CD. Hence, it is never chosen.
Optimal Contracts as a Function of (α,θ). First, notice that the above contracts exhaust
the set of optimal contracts. There is no gain for I to lend D>K . For any extra dollar lent, I gets
back at most a fraction α ≤ 1 of it in G and no more than D−K in any other state: increasing the
size of the loan only undermines break even without bringing any beneﬁt. In addition, the above
analysis shows: a) in terms of ex post eﬃciency, for θ>0 the ranking among the contracts not yet
ruled out is: CO Â CD Â SD Â no contract (if CO and CD fare equally well); b) in terms of ex
ante eﬃciency, there are two regimes: i) if α ≥ α∗ = L/y2 then CO ∼ CD Â SD; ii) if α<α ∗
then SD Â CD Â CO.I f α =1all contracts are chosen. There are two cases: i) αSD ≥ α∗ (i.e.
at α∗ SD is infeasible), then deﬁne αC = αCO, αS = αCO.N o w SD is never optimal because
when feasible it is dominated ex post by CO, which are also feasible; ii) αSD <α ∗ (i.e. at α∗ SD
is feasible), then deﬁne αC = αCD, αS = αSD.N o wi fSD is feasible, it is also optimal provided
other contracts are infeasible (i.e. if αS ≤ α<α C); if CD is feasible, it is also optimal provided
CO is infeasible (i.e. if αC ≤ α<α O). CO is optimal whenever feasible (i.e. if αO ≤ α) because
it yields the ﬁrst best. This proves Proposition 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . With ex post renegotiation, I may beneﬁt from lending D = K + t,
t>0. Setting t>0 only undermines break even under CO because I on average recoups only a
fraction of it. t>0 only helps to reduce ex post ineﬃciencies and may thus be optimal only under
CD and SD. We study the model under two alternative assumptions on bargaining power, when I
38(resp. E) has full bargaining power
1) I has the bargaining power. In G,i tm u s tb ed1(G)=α(y1 +t)+(1−α)y2,d 2(G)=αy2.I f
t =0repayment in G is unaﬀected by renegotiation. Moreover, because CO maximizes I’s payoﬀ,
it is renegotiation proof also in B and U. What about CD and SD?i )CD. With probability θ,
the ﬁrm is liquidated in U.N o wt>0 may allow E to bribe I in U to reorganize before the court
enforces the contract. Since α<α ∗, I gets αy2 + θ(L − αy2).I ft∗ = θ(L − αy2), E bribes I to
continue in U. This contract yields the ﬁrst best if feasible, i.e. if:
t∗ ≡ θ(L − αy2) ≤ [π(y2 + αy1)+( 1 /2)(1 − π)(L + αy2) − K]/(1 − απ). (6)
The logic of (6) is that only if t∗ is suﬃciently small can CD achieve the ﬁr s tb e s tw h e nI lends
K + t∗ to E. Condition (6) deﬁnes a function θR (α) such that I breaks even iﬀ θ ≤ θR (α).F o r
θ>θ R (α), the parties use CD with t =0 .N o t i c et h a ti ft>0 it is optimal to set t = t∗ because
it maximizes the chances of break even. ii) SD. Here, for I to bribe E we need t = L − αy2.T h i s
is feasible iﬀ π(y2 + αy1)+( 1− π)αy2 − (1 − α)(L − αy2) ≥ K. But this only holds iﬀ CO is
feasible as well. Hence, if SD is optimal, t =0and over liquidation cannot be renegotiated away.
Optimal Contracts as a function of (α,θ). The main diﬀerence with respect to Proposition 1
is that for αS ≤ α<α C there is an increasing function θR (α) such that, for θ ≤ θR (α) CD plus
t∗ = θ(L − αy2) yields the ﬁrst best. Otherwise, nothing changes.
2) E has all the bargaining power. Now renegotiation allows E to reduce repayment. In G,
incentive compatibility is d1(G)+d2(G) ≤ α(y1 + t)+m a x[ L,αy2],a t t a i n e dw i t hλ(G;NR)=1 ,
d1(G;NR)=L+α(y1+t) if α<α ∗ and at λ(G;NR)=0 , d1(G;NR)=α(y1+t), d2(G;NR)=αy2
if α ≥ α∗. T h i si sl e s st h a nI can obtain under no renegotiation. Let us now look at B and
U, considering diﬀerent contracts. i) CO. Because E or I has the incentive to liquidate in U
and reorganize in B, any threat they might use to increase their payoﬀ is not credible. Thus,
renegotiation does not aﬀect CO in U and B.i i i )CD. I has still the right to liquidate/reorganize
the project. The only diﬀerence is that t∗ = θ(L−αy2), over liquidation is renegotiated away in U.
If θ ≤ θR (α) this contract yields the ﬁrst best. iv) SD. Nothing changes as t = L−αy2 is infeasible
when SD is optimal. Optimal Contracts as a function of (α,θ).T h eo n l yd i ﬀerence with the
case where I has full bargaining power is that, due to lower repayment in G, all thresholds become
larger.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 . This corollary simply follows from the Proof of Proposition 2.T h e r e ,
39the optimal contract maximizes social welfare for given enforcement constraints (α,θ). Because
the same constraints must be satisﬁed by any state-mandated procedure, unless such procedure
is identical to that arising under the optimal contract then an inferior (ex ante and/or ex post)
outcome occurs. To see this, assume that the state-mandated procedure produces a diﬀerent liqui-
dation/reorganization outcome than the optimal contract. Then, either the workout fails because
E is wealth constrained and the parties are stuck with an ineﬃcient outcome, or the workout suc-
ceeds but then I must make some concessions to E (relative to the optimal contract maximizing
repayment to I), which reduces I’s repayment, especially if E has a lot of bargaining power. For
example, suppose that E has all the bargaining power and the state-mandated procedure always
induces reorganization, giving Iα y 2 (ω). Then, I always bribes E to liquidate in B a n de xp o s te ﬃ-






For any α, such repayment is strictly less than that arising under convertible debt.A s a r e s u l t ,
although in this example private workouts ensure ex post eﬃciency in spite of an ex post ineﬃcient
state-mandated procedure, they cannot improve upon the outcome under the optimal contract. In
fact, when convertible debt is feasible, it (weakly) dominates workouts from an ex ante standpoint.
When convertible debt is not feasible, ex ante ﬁnancing under a state-mandated procedure plus
ex post private workout is infeasible, too. As a result, even in this range contractual freedom is
superior because it allows the parties to attain the second best with contingent debt and the third
best with straight debt. The same argument can be used for other state-mandated procedures.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . When all liquidation rights are given to one single creditor, the multiple
creditors case is very similar to the one creditor case. The main diﬀerence with the one creditor case
is that the creditor holding liquidation rights does not get the full equity of the reorganized ﬁrm
nor all liquidation proceeds (net of the write-down). Now liquidation and reorganization proceeds
can also go to other creditors. Under CO such creditor is given a share x of the reorganized ﬁrm




in liquidation, thereby having the right incentives. In each state
the other creditors are promised the remaining repayment that the single creditor would obtain.
The same logic is used to replicate CD (where now dL(B) >x y2 >d L(U))a n dSD.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . For α<α S, the project is not ﬁnanced. The multiplicity of creditors
cannot increase total repayment in G above αy1 + y2 and above L in U and B. But this is
what (with one creditor) SD pays out, which is infeasible if α<α S. If αC ≥ α ≥ αS,o n l y
SD is feasible under a single creditor. By analogy, under multiple creditors break even requires
liquidation in both U and B.T h u s , E can issue several debt structures faring equally well (he
40can even disperse liquidation rights), and the outcome is the same as under a single creditor
SD.I nU and B, the optimal contracts may allow for liquidation of only fraction f<1,w h e r e
π(y2 + αy1)+( 1 /2)(1 − π)
h
fL+( 1− f)α(y2 + y2)
i
= K. Yet, setting f<1 is only eﬃcient for
E if L<(y2 + y2)/2, otherwise the welfare gain in U is more than compensated by the loss in
B.I fL ≥ (y2 + y2)/2, f =1is optimal. For α ≥ αC, the debt structure of Proposition 4 yields





in liquidation and an equity stake x on the reorganized ﬁrm. Then, not only has
he the incentive to undertake the eﬃcient liquidation policy, but also he cannot credibly threaten E
or other creditors to do something ineﬃcient so as to extract resources from them. To gauge the role
of the creditor’s stake and of debt dispersion, consider the possibility of renegotiation in U (there
is no renegotiation in B as all creditors prefer liquidation over continuation). If there are n − 1
identical creditors not having liquidation rights, a coalition of at least e m(n)=( n−1)
αy2−dL
L−dL−(1−x)αy2
of them is needed to bribe the large creditor to liquidate. Clearly, e m(n) is maximized by setting




2) =( n−1)v. Thus, liquidation in U occurs
with probability Pr(m ≥ e m(n)|n − 1) =
Pn−1
s=(n−1)v [(n − 1)!/(n − 1 − s)!s!]/2n−1. For given n,
this probability is minimized by setting x as large as possible (i.e. by giving the creditor holding
liquidation rights a large stake in the ﬁrm), in particular e m(n) ≥ n−2 i fa n do n l yi fx ≥ (n−2)(L−
αy2)/α(y2−y2). In other words, the creditor holding liquidation rights should have a large stake so
as to minimize the probability of being bribed into ineﬃcient liquidation. For n → +∞, this tends
to limn→∞ [(n − 1)!/(n − 1 − nv)!nv!]/2n−1, which is equal, by Stirling’s approximation lnn! ≈
nlnn−n,t olimn→∞ exp{(n − 1)ln(n − 1) − (n(1 − v) − 1)ln(n(1 − v) − 1) − nv lnnv − 1}/2n−1.
The numerator of the limit tends to exp(−1), the denominator to +∞.A sar e s u l t ,f o rn → +∞,
Pr(m ≥ e m(n)|n − 1)→ 0 and the ﬁrst best is attained.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . The ﬁrst best is to invest iﬀ r>2F and to reorganize iﬀ ω = U.
Call C the creditor holding liquidation rights of Proposition 4. Suppose that C is given the right
to raise, in ﬁnancial distress, supra priority ﬁnance with respect to dispersed claims and that, if D
is raised, repayment to C under reorganization is reduced by θD. At the optimal reorganization
policy, C raises new ﬁnancing (and invests) provided xαr−θD ≥ 0.N e wﬁnancing is raised only if
investment takes place. At the same time, C ﬁnds it proﬁtable to set D ≤ F.T h e n ,θ =2 xα induces
C to choose an ex post eﬃcient reﬁnancing (and investment) policy. C eﬃciently reorganizes iﬀ
xαy2+xα(r−2F)Z(D = F) ≥ L−S and xαy2+xα(r−2F)Z(D = F) ≤ L−S,w h e r eZ(D = F)
is an indicator taking value 1 if D = F and 0 otherwise. Because y2+r<L ,i ti sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd S
41such that both conditions hold. Thus, C can be given the incentive to eﬃciently resolve ﬁnancial
distress. Since F<L / 2, x and S can always be set such that F is ﬁnanced. Yet, this has ex ante
costs. Suppose that r is distributed according to a c.d.f. R(r) and r∗ = E(r|r>2I). Then, total
expected payout to initial creditors in ﬁnancial distress is
αy2 + L +[ 1− R(2F)](αr∗ − F)
If α<F / r ∗, investment reduces the payout to initial creditors. Thus, there is a αN such that, for
α<α N, investment undermines break even. For α<α N supra-priority ﬁnance is forbidden and
the debt structure of Proposition 5 is optimal.
Appendix 2: Extensions
A2.1: Uncertain Cash Flows and Liquidation Values. We now solve for the optimal
contract when ﬁrst and second period proﬁts as well as liquidation values are all stochastic and
take a continuum of values. The timing is the same as before. We focus on the case of multiple
creditors. To evaluate the incentive properties of the convertible debt contract previously analysed,
it is useful to study the optimal contracting problem faced by the parties if all payoﬀs are observable
by the court but still subject to the constraint that a fraction (1 − α) of proﬁts can be seized by
managers. In such a case, the contract includes a variable l(y1,y 2,L) stipulating — for each state
of nature (y1,y 2,L) — whether the ﬁrm should be liquidated, in which case l(y1,y 2,L)=1 ,o r
continued, in which case l(y1,y 2,L)=0 . With respect to creditor repayment, if in state (y1,y 2,L)
the project is liquidated then creditors are given L in the second period and cannot earn more than
αy1 in the ﬁrst period. This is because under liquidation the entrepreneur does not earn rents in
the second period and thus has no incentive to repay in the ﬁrst period as well. If instead in state
(y1,y 2,L) the project is continued, in line with the analysis of state G in Proposition 1,i nt h et w o
periods creditors either obtain αy1+y2 provided y1 >y 2 or αy2+y1 provided y2 >y 1.A sar e s u l t ,
if courts perfectly observe (y1,y 2,L), the optimal contract solves:
max
λ(y1,y2,L)
E {y1 + λ(y1,y 2,L)L +[ 1− λ(y1,y 2,L)]y2} (7)
s.t. E {λ(y1,y 2,L)(L + αy1)+[ 1− λ(y1,y 2,L)][(αy1 + y2)I(y1 >y 2)+( αy2 + y1)I(y1 ≤ y2)]} ≥ K
Then, the ﬁrst order conditions imply that the optimal contract stipulates liquidation in a given
42state if and only if:
(L − y2)+ω[L − αy2 − (1 − α)y1] > 0 for y1 <y 2
(L − y2)(1 + ω) > 0 for y1 >y 2
where ω is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the investors’ break even constraint. If the
break even constraint is not binding (i.e. ω =0 ), then liquidation occurs if and only if L>y 2.I f
instead ﬁrst period cash ﬂows are low (i.e. y1 <y 2) some socially unproﬁtable liquidations must
be undertaken to attain investor break even. Indeed, the above ﬁrst order condition implies for
y1 <y 2 that the project should be liquidated iﬀ L>L ∗ ≡ [y2 + ω(αy2 +( 1− α)y1)]/(1 + ω).
Clearly, if ω>0 then L∗ >y 2, implying that liquidation is sometimes socially ineﬃcient. While a
full comparative static analysis of this version of our model is clearly beyond the scope of our paper,
it is straightforward to see that under the optimal contract ineﬃcient liquidation (i.e. liquidation
in states where y1 <y 2) is more likely the lower is investor protection α. Once more, the intuition
is that if α is lower then the break even constraint becomes more binding, increasing the ex ante
beneﬁto fi n e ﬃcient liquidation.
We now show that the ﬁrst best eﬃcient outcome can be attained under a debt structure akin
to the one we found to be optimal in Section 4. Suppose that all liquidation rights are given to
one creditor whose credit is collateralized by a fraction l(y1,L) of physical assets. The physical
collateral of this creditor is allowed to vary with y1 to allow for debt write-downs, as found optimal
in Section 4. Courts can enforce l(y1,L) because they perfectly observe y1 and also observe L
after liquidation proceeds are collected. The creditor holding liquidation rights is also given a
c l a i mt oas h a r ex(y1,y 2) ≤ α of reorganization cash ﬂows (thus, a ﬂoating charge). The rest
of the second period proceeds are paid to the other creditors. Once more, courts can perfectly
enforce x(y1,y 2) because they can observe reorganization proﬁts once they are realized. Finally,
ﬁrst period repayment can be arbitrarily divided among the ﬂoating charge holder and any other
creditor. Indeed, ﬁrst period repayment does not directly enter our analysis because, for a given
liquidation policy, it is equal to the one prevailing in the previous model where the state of nature is
perfectly observed by courts. The only aspect that matters in this new context is the possibility for
the debt structure just discussed to implement, under an uninformed court, the perfect information
outcome attained in (7) above. Put diﬀerently, is it possible to write a contract inducing the
ﬂoating charge holder to implement the optimal, full information liquidation policy and attain the
43same amount of investor repayment? It is very easy to ﬁnd that the answer is yes. In particular,
it is suﬃcient to set x(y1,y 2)/l(y1,L)=1for any y1 >y 2 and x(y1,y 2)/l(y1,L)=L∗ (y1,y 2)
for any any y1 <y 2 (indeed, multiplier ω is a constant independent from speciﬁc realizations of
(y1,y 2,L)). There are many degrees of freedom for choosing speciﬁc reorganization and liquidation
stakes of creditors that induce the ﬂoating charge holder to implement the optimal full information
liquidation policy. For example, the debt contract may give the ﬂoating charge holder a share
of liquidation proceeds just equal to his share of reorganization proceeds, but then implement a
reduction in the creditor’s physical collateral (i.e. a debt write-down), when the ﬁrst period cash
ﬂow is low (and thus the ﬁrms is in ﬁnancial distress) relative to the second period cash ﬂow34.A t
the same time, it is immediate to see that under the liquidation policy implemented by the ﬂoating
charge holder total repayment to all creditors is equal to the perfect information one because, for a
given liquidation policy, the amount of realized cash ﬂows that can be disgorged to creditors is solely
determined by investor protection α. As a result, even in a complex and uncertain environment,
the ﬂoating charge induces investors to internalize the social costs and beneﬁts of reorganization
and thus to implement the constrained optimal resolution of ﬁnancial distress.
A2.2: Holdout in the Secondary Market. Suppose that α ∈ [αC,α ∗),t h es t a t ei sU and,
consistent with Proposition 4, the large secured creditor is owed xαy2 in reorganization and xαy2
in liquidation. There are N dispersed creditors, each owed (1−x)αy2/N in reorganization and (L−
xαy2)/N in liquidation. Because α<α ∗, the dispersed creditors are owed more under liquidation
than under eﬃcient reorganization. A party (e.g. one of the creditors) considers launching a
tender oﬀer for dispersed claims in the attempt to bribe the holder of liquidation rights and induce
(ineﬃcient) liquidation. Is the oﬀer going to succeed? The answer is yes if the bidder can buy a
number M of dispersed claims at a price p such that
xαy2 +( M/N)[(1− x)αy2 − Np] ≤ xαy2 +( M/N)
h
L − xαy2 − Np
i
which becomes condition M ≥ M∗ ≡ Nxα(y2 − y2)/
h
L − xαy2 − (1 − x)αy2
i
.A s a r e s u l t , t h e
tender oﬀer succeeds if and only if at least M∗ dispersed debtholders sell their claim. Does there
exist an equilibrium where this happens? The answer is not. To see that, suppose that there is a
negligible but positive cost of bidding. Then, if the bidder expects M<M ∗, his demand for claims
34Notice here that the level of second period cash ﬂow is initially truthfully announced by the ﬂoating charge holder
and then perfectly veriﬁed by courts ex post.
44Md(p) in the secondary market is N for p<(1 − x)αy2/N, and 0 otherwise. If instead the bidder
expects M ≥ M∗, his demand for claims Md(p) in the secondary market is N for p<(L−xαy2)/N
and 0 otherwise. When N is large and each creditor does not expect to be pivotal, the supply of
claims depends on the creditors’ (rational) expectation about M. If creditors think that M<M ∗,
then supply is 0 for p<(1−x)αy2/N, any number in [0,N] for p =( 1−x)αy2/N and N otherwise.
If creditors think that M ≥ M∗, then supply is 0 for p<(L − xαy2)/N,a n yn u m b e ri n[0,N] for
p =( L − xαy2)/N and N otherwise. It is immediate to see that demand and supply can never be
equal at M ≥ M∗. Indeed, at price p =( L−xαy2)/N the bidder has no incentive to buy any claim.
The only equilibrium is one where p =( 1− x)αy2/N and M =0 . The intuition is that, since for
the bidder to have appropriate incentives to buy p must be less than the fundamental value of the
claim, each creditor prefers not to sell, hoping that the others will sell.
A2.3: The Cost of Debt Dispersion. Creditors’ dispersion may be costly as it might hinder
their individual incentives to gather evidence, hire lawyers, etc. so as to void or rescind managerial
divertive activities, thereby reducing α,i . e .t h es h a r eo fc a s hﬂows that creditors can seize. Assume
that if creditor i engages in (unveriﬁable) legal eﬀort xi,h ep r e v e n t sE from diverting a share xi/n
of each creditor’s repayment. Thus, litigation is a public good: a creditor’s successful attempt to
monitor the debtor also beneﬁts the other creditors. To exert xi,c r e d i t o ri spends a share (1/2)δx2
i
of his own repayment. Thus, creditors’ expenditures are perfect substitutes in increasing the total
share of pledgeable cash ﬂows. This assumption is only made for simplicity: it ensures that creditors’
incentives do not depend on the value of their claims. Parameter δ ≥ 0 characterizes investor
protection in this Section. Then, each creditor individually invests xi =1 /(δn), and all creditors
obtain the same share α(n,δ)=( 2 n − 1)/2δn2 of their due repayment, which also corresponds to
t h eo v e r a l ls h a r eo fc a s hﬂows the debtor must disgorge. Intuitively, α(n,δ) falls in n because the
moral-hazard-in-team among creditors gets worse. Expression α(n,δ) can be integrated into the
analysis of Section 4. Now enforcement is described by (δ,θ) and the earlier predictions obtained
in the (α,θ)s p a c ec a nb ef o r m u l a t e di nt h e( δ,θ) space, with the main diﬀerence that our model
also yields predictions on the number of creditors n.O n e c a n t h u s d e ﬁne a function n(δ,α),w h i c h
indicates the maximum number of creditors from which E can borrow so as to disgorge a fraction
α of cash ﬂows under creditor protection δ. The larger is δ, the larger is the cost of creditors’
uncoordination as reﬂected in a smaller α and, in turn, the smaller is the maximum number of
creditors consistent with ﬁnancing. Thus, higher δ reduces the cost of the multiplicity of creditors
and aﬀects the optimal debt structure.
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